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COMMUNITIES OF INNOVATION 
Michael Mattioli 
ABSTRACT—This Article examines and evaluates the theory that patent 
holders privately self-correct the government’s excessive apportionment of 
patent rights by means of various cooperative efforts including patent pools, 
research consortia, and similar licensing collectives. According to some 
experts, these efforts are proof that market participants have the wisdom 
and the will to collectively disarm their patent arsenals in order to advance 
long-term innovation. But until now, this theory of market self-correction 
has not been evaluated through empirical study. Drawing on interviews and 
original research, this Article provides an ethnographic view of collective 
patent licensing episodes. Amidst these stories of success and failure, 
cooperation and conflict, the picture that emerges is more complex than 
theory alone predicts: government policies, the backward-looking concern 
of litigation over existing products, and various social goals significantly 
influence collective patent licensing. This study suggests some important 
refinements to theory and points the way forward for industry, lawmakers, 
and the public to begin a new discussion about the role of collective 
behavior in our patent system. 
 
AUTHOR—Microsoft Research Fellow, U.C. Berkeley School of Law 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the bold and puzzling theory that self-governed 
communities of patent holders are spurring innovation through patent 
sharing.1 The hope that markets can effectively shed excess patent rights to 
enhance dynamic efficiency sits at the crossroads of several avenues of 
contemporary legal and economic thought. Whether this emerging theory is 
supported, however, by the recent rise of high-profile patent-sharing efforts 
led by firms, universities, and governments remains an open and urgent 
question. By applying theoretical insights to a unique ethnographic study, 
this Article examines whether patent sharing is properly understood as a 
form of market self-regulation.2 
Patents embody a bargain. In exchange for the promise of useful 
innovations, society grants inventors an exclusive chance to profit from 
their ideas. Thomas Jefferson, America’s first patent examiner, once wrote 
to a Boston mill owner engaged in a patent dispute, “I know well the 
difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public 
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”3 With 
these words, Jefferson concisely and candidly framed the central challenge 
 
1  See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select 
Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 387–91, 432–37 (2009) (proposing that patent holders 
purposefully share their assets under certain circumstances to further collective innovation). 
2  The idea that intellectual property naturally evades excessive appropriation was expressed by 
Thomas Jefferson. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175, 180 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861) (“That ideas should be freely 
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and 
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when 
she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any point, and like 
the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement.”). 
3  Id. 
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behind patent law: crafting a property regime that does not overreach its 
purpose. 
Today, a rising chorus of critics argues that the U.S. patent system has 
become too big for its own good.4 The past thirty years have been marked 
by steep rises in the number of patent applications, issuances, and lawsuits.5  
From 1990 to 2009 alone, the number of U.S. patent filings nearly tripled.6 
Studies indicate that these increases do not stem from greater innovation, 
but rather from the deliberate attempts of firms to increase the size and 
reach of their patent holdings.7 
The trouble with excessive patent coverage lies in the layered nature of 
innovation. Just as Isaac Newton once spoke of seeing further by “standing 
on the shoulders of giants,” today’s innovators must continually build upon 
the work of their predecessors and peers.8 Inventions are not islands. 
Excessive patent coverage, however, can lead to situations where research 
and development projects infringe multiple patents held by different 
owners. Even for large firms and institutions, identifying and licensing such 
multitudes of patents is often too expensive and uncertain to justify. As a 
 
4  Many books and academic articles on the subject of patent overbreadth have been published in 
recent years. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 2 (2004) (“[T]he 
patent system—intended to foster and protect innovation—is generating waste and uncertainty that 
hinders and threatens the innovative process.”); see generally, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. 
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 
(2008) (arguing that the costs of the patent system outweigh its benefits, in part because mechanisms 
that might prevent patent proliferation are not working properly); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (discussing, inter alia, the 
proliferation of dubious patents and the harms of excessive patent litigation); NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 81–129 (Stephen A. 
Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NRC, 21ST CENTURY] (recommending improvements to the current 
patent system). 
5  JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 11–17 (characterizing these shifts as “the patent explosion”). 
6  In 1990, there were 176,264 patent filings, compared to 482,871 in 2009. PATENT TECH. 
MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND STATISTICS CHART, 
CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2010 (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
us_stat.htm. The number of patents issued during the period also grew from 99,077 to 191,927. Id. The 
rate of patent litigation may also be on the rise. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, 
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 56 (2005) (“[T]he rate of [patent] litigation is rising among 
small firms and firms with smaller total patents.”). But see Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8656, 
2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8656 (“[T]he growth in patenting has been comparable 
to the growth of litigation . . . .”). 
7  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 
868–69 (2007). 
8  Ironically, Newton’s famous quote is adapted from a similar metaphor used by Bernard of 
Chartres. See THE METALOGICON OF JOHN OF SALISBURY 167 (Daniel D. McGarry trans., Univ. of Cal. 
Press 1955) (1159) (“Bernard of Chartres used to compare us to [puny] dwarfs perched on the shoulders 
of giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have 
keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature.” 
(alteration in original)).  
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result, cumulative innovation is discouraged—a condition Michael Heller 
and Rebecca Eisenberg famously dubbed “The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons”9 and which this Article terms “patent gridlock.”10 
Two government institutions are typically blamed for this state of 
affairs: The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).11 Since its founding 
in 1982, the Federal Circuit—the sole venue for U.S. patent appeals from 
district courts—has steadily increased the scope and power of patents. The 
court has succeeded, for instance, in expanding the range of patentable 
subject matter to include business methods, software, and human genes.12  
The Federal Circuit has also developed and cultivated a high bar for 
proving patents invalid for obviousness, and has made it easier than ever for 
patent holders to shut down competitors’ businesses.13 The Supreme Court, 
however, has curtailed this jurisprudence in a series of reversals.14 
But the Federal Circuit may not be the only institution responsible: 
some commentators believe that the USPTO’s patentee-friendly practices 
have likewise contributed to the rise in patenting. Commentators estimate 
that the percentage of patent applications eventually granted is high—
 
9  Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–99 (1998) (discussing that a “specter of rights” surrounding 
patents may discourage investment in product development). 
10  This term was directly inspired by Michael Heller’s use of the term “gridlock” to describe 
transactional failures caused by excessive propertization. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: 
HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES xiii–xiv 
(2008). 
11  See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 1–24 (summarizing trends under the Federal Circuit 
and at the USPTO that have resulted in a greater apportionment of patent rights). 
12  Compare State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–75 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (establishing the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for patentable subject matter), and 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (disavowing the “useful, concrete, and tangible” test 
and replacing it with the “machine-or-transformation” test), with Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3226 (2010) (stating that the “machine-or-transformation” test is not the sole indicium of patentability 
and refusing to categorically exclude software patents or business methods). 
13  See, e.g., Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
10–11, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing that the Federal 
Circuit has made obviousness too difficult to prove); Rebecca Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating 
Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 889–902 (2004) 
(documenting diminished consideration of PHOSITAs in the Federal Circuit and proposing a new 
approach). 
14  See, e.g., KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418–19 (disapproving of the rigid use of the “teaching-
suggestion-motivation” or “TSM” test to determine nonobviousness); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (announcing that injunctions should not be automatically granted 
in patent cases, but rather, that courts should grant injunctions only upon careful consideration of an 
equitable “four-factor” test); Transcript of Oral Argument, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 
2238 (2011) (No. 10-290) (considering the appropriateness of the “clear and convincing” evidentiary 
standard for proving patent invalidity). 
106:103  (2012) Communities of Innovation 
 107
roughly in the neighborhood of 75%–85%.15 Reflecting on these trends, 
some leading commentators believe that the USPTO and Federal Circuit 
have together led the U.S. patent system into a crisis of excess.16 
As one might expect, scholars have advanced a variety of proposals for 
reforming these institutions. Some potential solutions would make patent 
grants harder to obtain—for instance, through increasing application fees,17 
fortifying the standard for obviousness,18 and increasing the rigor with 
which patent applications are reviewed at the USPTO.19 Another set of 
proposals would make it easier to prove patents invalid after they have 
issued. Such ex post suggestions include removing or weakening the 
presumption of validity that patents enjoy in court,20 revising appellate 
standards of review, and expanding reexamination procedures at the 
USPTO.21 Even bolder proposals abound, such as crafting a technology-
 
15  See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 181, 201 (2008) (stating that the USPTO “grants patents to more than 70% of those who apply”); 
Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office—One More Time, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 394–96 & tbls. 4–5 (2009) 
(reporting an overall rise in the USPTO’s grant rate since the founding of the Federal Circuit that, when 
adjusted to account for Refiled Continuing Applications, ranged between 77% and 92% during the years 
1995–2007 and ranged between 67% and 78% during the year 2008); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Ogden H. 
Webster & Richard Eichmann, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office—Extended, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 35, 38 (2002) (discussing different methods of 
estimating grant rate and estimating adjusted grant rate in which patents were granted on both parent and 
continuing applications at 85%). 
16  See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 3 (“The patent system is in crisis.”). 
17  See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 
727–28 (2010) (proposing the argument that higher prices will work to filter less valuable patents). 
18  See, e.g., John H. Barton, 2on-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492–93 (2003) (suggesting stricter 
nonobviousness standards in some industries). 
19  See, e.g., Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 131, 147–48 (citing negative consequences of weak review standards). 
20  See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (hearing arguments on this issue). 
But see Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923 (2004) (doubting that the presumption of validity should be altered). 
21  Two forms of post-grant reexamination procedures are available in the United States: (1) ex parte 
reexaminations, in which third-party challengers do not participate, 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–307 (2006), and 
(2) inter partes reexamination, in which they do, id. §§ 311–318. The types of evidence that can be used 
in these procedures are limited and the requirements for instituting post-grant challenges are strict. See 
id. § 312 (requiring that challengers offer prior art that presents “a substantial new question of 
patentability”). Some commentators have suggested that more meaningful review could be provided 
though, inter alia, allowing post-grant challenges to be based on novelty, nonobviousness, written 
description, enablement, and utility. See NRC, 21ST CENTURY, supra note 4, at 101. The America 
Invents Act fortifies these provisions. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 
284 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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specific patent system,22 offering a limited number of tradable patent 
rights,23 or even providing a menu of various types of patents.24 
But a new theme in legal scholarship advances a fundamentally 
different solution to patent gridlock. In recent publications, leading 
commentators have suggested that the patent system can be remedied not by 
the institutions that govern it, but by the very constituents it serves. The 
answer to patent gridlock, these scholars believe, is patent sharing. In a 
recent contribution to the Yale Law Journal, Jonathan Barnett proposed 
that, given sufficiently low coordination costs, firms will invest in various 
mechanisms to lower the effective level of patent protection in 
overpropertized markets.25 One of the chief mechanisms Barnett discusses is 
private “sharing regimes” in which rights holders formally pledge 
nonassertion to facilitate cumulative innovation.26 In a similar vein, Robert 
Merges has recently written of the market’s self-regulating “impulse” to 
depropertize, as evidenced by research consortia and Creative Commons.27 
These and similar arguments point to the alluring possibility that, at least to 
some extent, innovation losses caused by patent gridlock can be overcome 
by coordinated private action. This theory, termed herein the “Market 
Correction Hypothesis,” could be a paradigm-shifting revelation: if 
innovation markets require only time and favorable conditions, rather than 
government intervention, then policymakers may not need to “fix” the 
patent system at all. 
The Market Correction Hypothesis poses an urgent question that 
demands empirical study. Existing scholarship on this topic, while 
immensely valuable, is based in large part on economic theory and 
generalized examples, but not on the complex and often confusing realities 
 
22  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1662 
(2003). 
23  See generally Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 881–93 (proposing a system of tradable 
patent rights and explaining how such a system might work). 
24  See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
207 (2011) (introducing two new types of patent rights dubbed “quasi-patents” and “semi-patents” that, 
if incorporated into the legal system, would expand the menu of intellectual property protections 
available to investors beyond the current binary one-size-fits-all system). 
25  Barnett, supra note 1, at 412 (positing that, under certain conditions, “[t]he market will tend to 
adjust excessive allocations of intellectual property entitlements in order to maximize the cumulative 
stream of innovation gains net of transaction costs”). 
26  Id. at 389 (introducing the term “sharing regimes”). 
27  Robert P. Merges, A 2ew Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (2004) 
(“[T]he increasing importance of the public domain may represent a partial self-correcting impulse in 
the IP system.”). Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that provides copyright licenses 
designed to allow and encourage intellectual property owners to retain some, but not all, rights to their 
work. See About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org/about (last visited Mar. 9, 
2012) (describing how Creative Commons’s “some rights reserved” model works). 
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of patent sharing.28 Through empirical study, the Market Correction 
Hypothesis can be evaluated, refined if necessary, and used to inform 
policymakers. The value in examining property-sharing regimes has already 
been vividly demonstrated in the field of natural resource sharing. Nobelist 
Elinor Ostrom, for instance, sought to understand why shared natural 
resources such as rivers and grazing land do not always suffer from chronic 
overuse, as the proverbial “tragedy of the commons” predicts.29 This inquiry 
led Ostrom to study natural-resource-sharing communities around the 
globe—from remote Japanese villages to Swiss mountain towns.30 Ostrom 
found that the structure and workings of property-sharing communities are 
often highly contextual and cannot be adequately described by theory 
alone.31 
In a comparable way, this Article evaluates the Market Correction 
Hypothesis by studying technological communities that share inventions—
“communities of innovation.”32 Unlike traditional “patent pools,”33 which 
lower the costs of manufacturing existing products by bundling patent 
licenses together, communities of innovation are primarily aimed at 
facilitating the development of future products. 
This Article’s method of inquiry is ethnographic rather than data-
driven. Information was gathered from a variety of sources, including 
firsthand interviews with experts at key companies and research 
institutions, press reports, legislative records, and historical documents.34 By 
synthesizing this information into a series of case studies, this Article aims 
 
28  See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 297–98 (2003) (“A standard response to [the concern about an 
anticommons]—that market forces will motivate the emergence of patent pools and other institutions for 
bundling intellectual property rights, thereby reducing transaction costs and permitting the parties to 
realize gains from exchange—is an empirical claim that has not yet been borne out by the experience of 
the biomedical research community.” (footnote omitted)). 
29  See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 182–85 (1990) (analyzing research findings and concluding, inter alia, that the 
Tragedy of the Commons is sometimes useful as a generalized model but that it does not always 
accurately characterize the behavior of communities). 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  In a recent contribution to the Columbia Law Review, Gideon Parchomovsky and I discussed the 
rise of communal patent sharing and explored how “communities of innovation” could be finely tuned to 
better serve their constituents. See Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 24, at 233–43. 
33  See infra note 107. 
34  This study stems from personal experience. In 2010, I served as outside pro bono patent counsel 
to Creative Commons when it designed a general purpose open patent license. Our license directly 
influenced the practices of The GreenXchange (GX)—a large patent-sharing initiative led by Nike, 
Yahoo!, and Best Buy. In the course of our work, our group carefully studied the successes and failures 
of similar communities of innovation, many of which have emerged in just the past few years. Using this 
experience as a seed, I embarked on a broader study of patent-sharing efforts worldwide. My goal was to 
evaluate the extent to which communal patent licensing is properly understood as a market “correction” 
that will facilitate cumulative innovation. 
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to provide a deep and nuanced view of the complex motivations, behaviors, 
and contextual factors implicated by the Market Correction Hypothesis.35 
Unlike a more exhaustive data-driven analysis, this study does not strive to 
independently formulate a model of how markets behave. Rather, the 
inquiry attempts to probe the applicability of an existing hypothesis. 
The discussion unfolds in three parts: Part I introduces the dilemma of 
patent gridlock and the controversial notion that self-governed communities 
of patent holders can overcome this problem. Part II is an original 
ethnographic study of patent-sharing communities infused with historical 
insights. These episodes challenge the Market Correction Hypothesis by 
revealing that cooperation among patent holders has been significantly 
motivated by government policies and programs, by litigation over existing 
technologies, and by charitable goals. Part III discusses the normative 
implications of this study and offers a policy recommendation. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
I. OVERCOMING THE ANTICOMMONS 
A powerful and puzzling theory is emerging among legal scholars: the 
threat to innovation caused by the government’s excessive provision of 
patent rights can be remedied through private cooperation. The hope that 
technology markets will shed excess patents to encourage the research and 
development of new inventions finds theoretical support from leading 
scholars and, quite possibly, evidentiary support in a set of patent-licensing 
coalitions led by large corporations.36  But perhaps this optimistic vision is 
oversimplified. Drawing on legal and economic theory, the following 
discussion explains the underpinnings of patent gridlock and the emerging 
Market Correction Hypothesis. 
A. The Dilemma of Patent Gridlock 
The director of patent licensing at a major U.S. research institution 
interviewed for this Article disclosed a surprising fact: most scientific 
researchers at universities ignore patents.37 The director explained that the 
 
35  See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 29, at 55–56 (explaining how in-depth case studies can be 
abstracted in order to examine and advance theoretical understandings of collective behavior). 
36  For a description of the theoretical support, see infra Part I.B. For a discussion of the possible 
empirical support, see infra Part II. 
37  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #5 (Oct. 7, 2010). Many of the individuals 
interviewed for this Article only commented on condition of anonymity. As a result, some of the 
interviews in this Article avoid references to specific individuals. This anecdotal comment made by 
Source #5 is supported by well-documented evidence. See, e.g., John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley 
M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN 
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 305–07 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) 
(documenting the impact of patents on early-stage research and reporting that patents often go 
unlicensed at early stages); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the 
Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021 (2003) (same); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 2oncompliance, 
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cost of locating and licensing the potential multitude of patents that might 
cover any single avenue of research is often too high to justify.38 As a result, 
the director explained, research is often pursued with disregard for patents. 
If and when patents later come to light, product development is sometimes 
abandoned altogether.39 Michael Heller recently reported an even more 
distressing story from the halls of the pharmaceutical industry: Heller’s 
anonymous source, the CEO of a large drug company, stated that his 
researchers have developed an effective treatment for Alzheimer’s disease 
that remains shelved because it likely infringes numerous patents.40 Going 
public with the drug, the CEO explained, would likely drown his company 
in litigation.41 Similar reports have surfaced in other industries.42 
Patent gridlock of this kind was first predicted over a decade ago by 
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, who called the phenomenon “the 
tragedy of the anticommons.”43 The proverbial “tragedy of the commons”44 
often turns up in the press. If a resource—a lake containing fish, for 
instance—is commonly held, individuals will use it as much as possible 
because no single user will bear the full costs of overuse. Fishermen will 
tend to ignore the collective long-term costs of their activities, drop their 
nets en masse, and render the waters barren.45 Heller and Eisenberg, by 
contrast, were concerned with the converse dilemma: the underutilization of 
property that results from an excessive distribution of exclusionary rights 
among multiple owners.46 
The tragedy of the anticommons is not limited to the realm of patents.47 
In fact, the effects of this problem are an everyday sight in some developing 
cities. After Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2004, for example, 
real estate developers leapt at the opportunity to purchase parcels of land 
while prices were low.48 Despite these investments, however, large swaths 
 
2onenforcement, 2onproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 
1059, 1063–66 (2008) (summarizing earlier studies); id. at 1098 (“Within the academy, scientists 
generally ignore patents and rarely face patent enforcement.”). 
38  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #5, supra note 37. 
39  Id. 
40  HELLER, supra note 10, at xiii. 
41  Id. 
42  See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 31. 
43  Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9. 
44  This concept was introduced in an influential article in Science written by the ecologist Garrett 
Hardin in the late 1960s. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
45  See Peter Passell, One Answer to Overfishing: Privatize the Fisheries, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 
1995, at D2 (discussing the problem of overfishing as a prime example of the tragedy of the commons). 
46  See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699. 
47  See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (utilizing the theory of the anticommons to explain the 
phenomenon of empty storefronts in Socialist countries where property rights are highly disaggregated). 
48  William Carlos Spaht, Note, Overcoming Another Tragedy in 2ew Orleans: Rebuilding in the 
Wake of Kelo and Act 2o. 851, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1599, 1613–14 (2007). 
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of the city remained in ruins for years. This was in part because many 
construction projects could not begin without the permission of property 
owners who had fled the city following the disaster.49 The challenge of 
identifying and coordinating so many individual rights holders made 
rebuilding costly and slow.50 Quite literally, houses “divided” could not 
stand.51 
Excessively fragmented property rights can also lead to holdup 
problems. In China, property developers use the term “nail house” to 
describe uncooperative homeowners who, like stubborn nails stuck in a 
wall, refuse to be uprooted.52 Dramatic photographs of single homes 
surrounded by bulldozers commonly appear in Chinese magazines and 
newspapers.53 To the general public, nail houses are symbols of defiance in 
the face of sweeping industrialization.54 To economists, they reflect 
hardnosed bargaining: the longer these homeowners hold out, the better 
their bargaining positions with developers become. 
Heller and Eisenberg showed that tragedies of the anticommons can 
also strike intellectual property markets. Long ago, manufacturing a 
product—a steam engine, say—typically required licensing one or two 
patents.55 But as technologies have grown more complex, so too have webs 
of patent coverage. Today, the products that fuel our economy, such as 
software, drugs, financial services, and the like may be covered by dozens 
or hundreds of patents owned by a multitude of different inventors.56 As a 
result, the relationships between patents, patent owners, and products are 
 
49  Id. at 1614. 
50  Id. at 1614–15. 
51  A reference to Abraham Lincoln’s famous “houses divided” speech, given in Springfield, Illinois 
on June 16, 1853. See 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (2008) (“A house divided 
against itself cannot stand.”). Lincoln derived this phrase from a Biblical passage. See Mark 3:25 (King 
James) (“And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.”). 
52  See, e.g., Howard W. French, Homeowner Stares Down Wreckers, at Least for a While, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at A4 (reporting on a homeowner who had attracted media attention for holding 
out against land developers, despite significant pressure from private stakeholders and the Chinese 
government itself); Richard McGregor & Sun Yu, China’s ‘2ail House’ Floors Developers, FT.COM 
(Mar. 27, 2007 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f1c5bc28-dbff-11db-9233-000b5df10621.html 
(reporting that the owner of the nail house demanded a price from developers that exceeded local market 
rates). 
53  Homeowner Stands Down, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A3, available at http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04EFDC1F30F930A35757C0A9619C8B63 (reporting that the 
same property owner eventually reached an agreement with land developers). 
54  See, e.g., French, supra note 52; McGregor & Yun, supra note 52. 
55  See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent 
Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123, 124 (Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2001) (“A patent, for example, was 
conceived as a property right over a single, coherent product occupying a distinct economic market.”). 
56  See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1857, 1868 (2003) (“Cumulative innovation is the hallmark of high-tech industries such as computer 
software, semiconductors, molecular biology, and pharmacology.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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often nuanced and complex. Patent gridlock can occur horizontally—e.g., 
when multiple patents would cover a final product57—or vertically—e.g., 
when multiple patents would be infringed during different stages of a 
research and development process.58 In both cases, assembling such 
fragmented rights into useful mosaics of patent coverage can impose steep 
transaction costs on would-be innovators.59 
Ronald Coase showed that “transaction costs” are a natural and 
necessary consequence of any property regime.60 In his classic article, The 
Problem of Social Cost, Coase explained that transferring property always 
costs more than a purchase price alone: 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is 
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on 
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the 
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on.61 
But beyond such ordinary transaction costs, additional costs arise when 
a single product can only be developed by gathering various parts owned by 
multiple monopolists, as is currently the case in technology fields where 
excessive patent rights exist.62 This fact was revealed by the French 
mathematician, Antoine Augustin Cournot. In an 1838 essay titled Theory 
of the Mutual Relations of Producers, Cournot proved that the total cost of 
purchasing complementary goods from multiple monopolists is always 
greater than the cost of purchasing the same goods from a single 
monopolist.63 Coase’s and Cournot’s enduring insights explain why 
 
57  See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699 (“A proliferation of patents on individual fragments 
held by different owners seems inevitably to require costly future transactions to bundle licenses 
together before a firm can have an effective right to develop [future commercial products].”). 
58  See id. 
59  See id.; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76–77 (discussing the horizontal–vertical divide). 
60  See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 
372 (2002) (discussing transaction costs). 
61  R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
62  See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 297 (“Transaction costs mount quickly when the basic 
research discoveries necessary for subsequent work are owned not by one entity, but by a number of 
different entities.”). 
63  AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF 
WEALTH 103–04 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus. M. Kelley 2d ed. 1971) (1838) (noting “the 
composite commodity will always be made more expensive, by reason of separation of interests than by 
reason of the fusion of monopolies. . . . [T]he more there are of articles thus related, the higher the price 
determined by the division of monopolies will be, than that which would result from the fusion or 
association of the monopolists.”); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76 (discussing Augustin 
Cournot’s Theory of Complements). 
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developing products that require patent licenses from multiple owners is 
often inefficiently expensive.64 
Like the nail houses that stall the development of China’s growing 
metropolises, complementary patents can also allow their owners to 
demand exorbitant “holdout” fees.65 If multiple patent holders each attempt 
this negotiating strategy, the cost of developing new products can become 
prohibitive.66 This observation, considered along with Cournot’s insights on 
complementary goods, reveals a subtle but important point: patent gridlock 
results from the distribution of complementary patent rights among 
different owners, not just the sheer number of patents in a given market. 
Patent gridlock is difficult to measure and quantify directly, but experts 
have documented its existence.67 Stephen Maurer, for instance, described 
the failure of a genetic patent exchange initiative led by research institutions 
in the late 1990s.68 After years of negotiations and planning, the effort was 
abandoned because the participants reached a patent licensing impasse.69 In 
the field of biotechnology, Rebecca Eisenberg looked into similar patent-
bargaining failures that she learned of during her time as chair of the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools.70 
Likewise, Janet Hope reported on patent bargaining failures impeding drug 
innovation.71 Among other anecdotes, Hope quoted a biotechnology 
executive’s description of a decade-long effort to pool intellectual property 
as resulting in “complete and total constipation.”72 
 
64  BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76 (“[T]he price of the integrated product will be inefficiently 
high—and output inefficiently low . . . .”). This problem is distinct from, and potentially more harmful 
than, the static efficiency costs of underproduction and supracompetitive pricing that are part and parcel 
of any patent regime. See id. at 76–77. 
65  See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 
1151, 1160 (2009) (describing the holdup or holdout phenomenon in economic terms); Carl Shapiro, 
2avigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124–26 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the patent holdup 
problem). 
66  See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76 (noting that holdouts can stifle product research 
and development when multiple patent holders are involved). 
67  But see, e.g., Chester J. Shiu, Of Mice and Men: Why an Anticommons Has 2ot Emerged in the 
Biotechnology Realm, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 413, 450–54 (2009) (denying the existence of an 
anticommons in the biotechnology industry based on empirical study). 
68  Stephen M. Maurer, Inside the Anticommons: Academic Scientists’ Struggle to Build a 
Commercially Self-Supporting Human Mutations Database, 1999–2001, 35 RES. POL’Y 839 (2006). 
69  Id. at 847–48. 
70  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This 
Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra 
note 55, at 223, 223–50 (discussing factors that led to bargaining failures in the realm of biomedical 
research and concluding that institutions to bring down transaction costs do not always arise). 
71  JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR: THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 28–67 (2008) 
(reporting on patent bargaining failures in the biotechnology industry). 
72  Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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How did this situation arise? Experts believe that the answer is clear: 
the government has made patents too plentiful and too powerful. Since the 
Federal Circuit’s founding in 1982, commentators have documented the 
court’s decisions extending the range of patentable subject matter to 
include, inter alia, software, business methods, and genes.73 The court has 
also been faulted for making it harder for defendants to prove invalidity due 
to obviousness.74 But the Federal Circuit is not the only institution to blame: 
Critics also believe the USPTO’s patentee-friendly practices (as reflected 
by the high grant rates cited in the Introduction to this Article) have 
contributed to significant increases in patent applications and issuances.75 
Legislation has likely played a part as well. Congress’s passage of the 1980 
Bayh-Dole Act, for instance, opened up publicly-funded research to 
patenting.76 By freeing university researchers to seek patents over genes and 
other research building blocks, and by limiting the ability of funding 
agencies to mandate licensing, this law likely contributed to the patent 
gridlock that commentators believe has impeded biomedical innovation.77 
The significant rise in patent applications, issuances, and litigation in recent 
decades has become a major theme of contemporary patent scholarship.78 
Tracing the problem back to its sources, scholars have proposed a 
variety of institutional reforms. Most proposals fall into one of three 
categories: The first set of reforms focuses on enhancing “costly screens” 
that act before or after patents are issued.79 The second set of reforms 
focuses instead on enhancing the “quality screens” that act during the initial 
prosecution stage or following patent issuance.80 The third category of 
reforms focuses on reducing the power of patents in the courtroom. Such 
proposals include, for example, abandoning or lowering the presumption of 
validity that patents carry.81 
More radical proposals have long been debated as well. Compulsory 
licensing, for example, could reduce coordination costs to manageable 
 
73  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
74  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
75  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
76  See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 200–211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–11 (1994)).   
77  See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 291 (noting that the Bayh-Dole Act likely contributed to 
significant increases in research patenting that may hinder scientific progress). 
78  See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing several contemporary books and articles on 
this topic). 
79  See, e.g., Masur, supra note 17, at 688–91 (discussing the application of a costly screening model 
to the procedures used by the USPTO). 
80  See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 184 (discussing post-grant reexaminations). 
81  But see Janis, supra note 20, at 923 (calling into question arguments for altering this 
presumption). 
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levels by vesting the right to set license fees in an independent body.82 Some 
scholars have even suggested doing away with patents altogether and 
instead introducing a set of government prizes or auctions for new 
inventions.83 While such proposals continue to stir debates among scholars 
and lawmakers, patent gridlock may only continue to limit potential 
technological advances. 
B. The Market Correction Hypothesis 
Can private cooperation increase the level of innovation in society? 
This idea, termed herein the “Market Correction Hypothesis,” is the 
synthesis—and in my view, the natural conclusion—of several converging 
themes in legal scholarship and industry practice. If sound, the Market 
Correction Hypothesis could have an important impact on innovators, 
policymakers, and even patterns of industrial organization.84 
In his writings on patent exchanges, Carl Shapiro helped lay the 
theoretical economic underpinnings of this idea. Drawing inspiration from 
Cournot’s research on monopolies, Shapiro argued that some forms of 
transactional gridlock could be overcome by licensing multiple patents 
under unified arrangements.85 By reducing the number of individual patent 
licenses needed, such arrangements could lower transaction costs and 
encourage efficiencies similar to those that Cournot identified under 
monopoly conditions.86 Shapiro presented patent pools (wherein multiple 
patents are licensed as a single package) and cross licenses (i.e., reciprocal 
patent license agreements) as the two mechanisms that could achieve such 
efficiencies.87 
Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky examined a slightly different 
way that property holders can collectively stimulate future innovation—
 
82  See generally Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of 
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 1001–02 (1977) (explaining a compulsory licensing 
system); Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 668–74, 683–85 (1988) (same). 
83  See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 37 (2004) (proposing and analyzing a scheme of intellectual property subsidies). 
84  Industrial organization is a branch of economics dedicated to the study of the structure of markets 
and the strategies of firms that operate within markets. See, e.g., Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and 
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1902 (2007) (defining industrial 
organization). 
85  See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 123, 127–29 (viewing patent pools and cross licenses through the 
lens of the “complements” problem Cournot identified). 
86  Id. at 123–24. Importantly, Shapiro recognized that the excessive balkanization of patent rights 
threatened not only the production of existing products, but also the research and development of future 
innovations. Id. at 124 (“[T]he prospect of paying such royalties necessarily reduces the return to new 
product design and development, and thus can easily be a drag on innovation and commercialization of 
new technologies.”). 
87  Id. at 123, 126–27. 
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through publishing, rather than patenting, scientific research.88 Challenging 
conventional wisdom, Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky explained that the 
publication of research data, combined with the pursuit of narrow patent 
rights, could benefit upstream and downstream inventors alike by fostering 
cumulative innovation.89 Like Shapiro, Parchomovsky and Bar-Gill’s 
position was primarily normative: they cogently explained the social and 
economic advantages of information sharing, rather than describing it as a 
behavior that markets necessarily display. 
Robert Merges posited that the phenomenon of collective licensing 
may reflect a limited market capability to “correct” for excessive property 
entitlements. Merges first discussed this idea in an article that explored how 
patent pools have sometimes arisen to break bottlenecks that prevent the 
production of existing products.90 Citing several episodes of collective IP 
licensing—including one examined in Part II of this Article—Merges 
concluded that the distribution of intellectual property entitlements among 
multiple owners can sometimes encourage investments in private exchange 
regimes that lower the costs of repeat bargaining.91 In subsequent work, 
Merges viewed patent licensing regimes as “private-ordering response[s]” 
to anticommons dilemmas.92 For support, Merges cited two notable patent 
contributions to the public domain: Merck’s decision to forgo enforcement 
of its gene fragment patents and IBM’s investments in open-source 
software.93 Merges suggested that such episodes “may reveal a self-
regulating aspect of the IP world that is just now coming into focus.”94 
Merges cautioned, however, that there is no reason to believe that private 
exchange regimes will always arise to perfectly offset the costs of excessive 
patent rights.95 
Jonathan Barnett recently developed Merges’s suggestion into a formal 
theory that innovation markets sometimes correct the government’s errors 
of overpropertization by, among other things, collectively ceding some of 
 
88  See generally Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 56 (examining the trend toward unprotected 
publishing of patentable material). 
89  Id. at 1860, 1872 (discussing this strategy). 
90  Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1340–58 (1996). 
91  Id. at 1391–92 (“Where firms are involved in such transactions repeatedly, institutions for 
regularized IPR exchange tend to emerge.”). 
92  Merges, supra note 27, at 186. 
93  Id. at 188–94 (discussing these two examples). 
94  Id. at 186. 
95  Id. at 203 (expressing qualified optimism); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 896 (1990) (recognizing that “[t]here 
is . . . no reason to assume that when blockages arise industries will always turn to the deadlock-
breaking solutions we have seen, patent pooling and cross licensing” and noting that government 
pressure has been an impetus in at least one case of patent pooling). 
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the rights patent law affords.96 Barnett’s theory is founded on the possibility 
that “large resource holders do not simply seek to maximize initial 
innovation gains . . . rather, they self-interestedly seek to maximize the 
cumulative stream of initial plus subsequent innovation gains.”97 Building 
on public choice literature, Barnett posited that market self-correction is 
most likely to arise in technology fields defined by cumulative innovation 
and in markets that enjoy low coordination costs.98 
Barnett’s position draws on selected anecdotes. He cites a set of 
historical episodes of invention sharing as evidence that markets indeed are 
capable of encouraging future innovation by ceding patent protections. 
These include: the pooling of automotive patents in the early twentieth 
century, AT&T/Bell Labs’ decision to license transistor patents for low 
royalty fees, the publication of knowhow and research data by large 
corporate research firms including IBM, instances in which firms opted 
neither to seek nor to enforce patents in the fields of biotechnology, open-
source software and financial services, and various patent pools.99 Although 
Barnett does not suggest that markets always work perfectly to overcome 
all imperfections, he suggests, like Merges, that the patent anticommons is 
not as “tragic” as conventional belief holds.100 
These hopeful insights find something of an analogue in the work of 
famed political economist Elinor Ostrom. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
Ostrom’s firsthand studies of natural-resource-sharing communities around 
the world revealed that rational economic actors are surprisingly capable of 
developing private collective action solutions to problems of overuse.101 
Ostrom’s work contradicted widely accepted theories on collective action 
and spawned an important body of empirical literature on sharing “common 
pool resources.”102 
The notion that intellectual property markets are capable of curing the 
converse problem of chronic underuse is appealing. Tragedies of the 
commons and anticommons spring from the same source: the government’s 
initial misallocation of property rights.103 As every first-year law student 
knows, “property” includes rights to use and rights to exclude. When rights 
to use are shared among many individuals, such as with fishing waters, 
 
96  Barnett, supra note 1, at 442–43 (discussing investment in “transactional arrangements” designed 
to lower patent protections and increase cumulative innovation). 
97  Id. at 432 (emphasis omitted). 
98  Id. at 424. 
99  Id. at 434–37. 
100  Id. at 431. 
101  OSTROM, supra note 29 (discussing natural resource sharing). 
102  See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a 
Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (2003) (analyzing scholarly information as a 
common pool resource). 
103  See Heller, supra note 47, at 625–26, 667 (referring to the paucity of commentary on the 
symmetrical relationship between commons and anticommons property). 
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overuse (i.e., tragedies of the commons) can result. When rights to exclude 
are fragmented among multiple owners, as in the case of post-Katrina New 
Orleans, underuse (i.e., tragedies of the anticommons) can result. 
Shapiro, Merges, Parchomovsky, Bar-Gill, and most recently Barnett, 
have each contributed to a new vision of the relationship between 
intellectual property holders and the public institutions that form our patent 
system. The Market Correction Hypothesis posits that private actors will 
sometimes respond to the government’s excessive provision of patent rights 
through collective nonenforcement. Although it has been known since the 
time of Cournot that aggregating complementary goods can lower 
production costs, the crucial new insight distinguishing the Market 
Correction Hypothesis from previous theories is its focus on future products 
rather than existing ones. The Market Correction Hypothesis proposes that, 
under the right circumstances, collective nonenforcement can lay the 
groundwork for innovation. 
To what extent does the Market Correction Hypothesis describe and 
explain the behavior of patent holders? None of the scholars who have 
contributed to this theory posit that markets are always capable of perfectly 
correcting for excessive property rights. Moreover, a set of experiments 
conducted by economists in 2006 revealed that in practice, rational actors 
have far more trouble extracting themselves from anticommons dilemmas 
than from tragedies of the commons.104 The study concluded: “[I]t is 
inadequate to extrapolate findings from the commons to the anticommons 
dilemma.”105 While these experiments do not directly contradict the Market 
Correction Hypothesis, they call attention to the relative paucity of 
empirical literature on invention sharing as compared to the far more 
extensive empirical literature on real property sharing. As it stands, the 
Market Correction Hypothesis is rooted in economic theory but has not yet 
benefitted from the color, nuance, and complexity that only an empirical 
examination can reveal.106 
II. CURRENT AND HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
This Part examines communities of innovation by drawing on 
interviews, independent research, and firsthand observations made during 
my time as pro bono outside counsel to an emerging patent-sharing 
initiative. The collaborations discussed in the paragraphs that follow are 
ideal test cases for the Market Correction Hypothesis. Unlike traditional 
patent pools, these institutions do not exist solely to lower the cost of 
 
104  Sven Vanneste, Alain Van Hiel, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, From “Tragedy” to 
“Disaster”: Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 104 
(2006). 
105  Id. at 118. 
106  See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28 (stating that, in the biomedical research community, the 
Market Correction Hypothesis “is an empirical claim that has not yet been borne out”). 
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producing existing products, but rather, they purport to encourage the 
research and development of products that do not yet exist.107 Contributors 
to these initiatives include corporate juggernauts such as HP, IBM, 
Ericsson, Nokia, Sony, Nike, Yahoo!, Best Buy, and GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK), as well as several major research institutions and the governments 
of the United States and South Africa. This study provides a rare look at 
collective patent licensing from the perspectives of those involved. 
Three themes emerge from this investigation, each of which is 
elaborated upon below. First, government often plays an important role in 
encouraging communities of innovation. This fact challenges the Market 
Correction Hypothesis’s depiction of private actors correcting government 
propertization errors. Second, some patent-sharing efforts are, contrary to 
public statements, focused more on the near-term goal of avoiding or 
settling litigation over existing products than on the more forward-looking 
goal of encouraging research and development. Third, some communities of 
innovation are charitable in nature, suggesting that, contrary to the Market 
Correction Hypothesis, they are motivated more by social goals than by 
private profits. These themes shed new light on the role of collective action 
in technology markets. 
A. Government-Influenced Communities 
The Market Correction Hypothesis posits that sometimes patent 
holders respond to the government’s excessive distribution of patents by 
cooperating. But the following episodes tell a different story. Here, through 
exhortations, interventions, and the provision of incentives, the “visible 
hand” of public policy guides patent holders toward cooperation and away 
from patent gridlock.108 
 
107  The term “patent pool,” as it is commonly used by legal scholars, describes a set of patent 
licenses that facilitate production or assembly of an end-product that has already been invented. See, 
e.g., Merges, supra note 90, at 1340; Shapiro, supra note 65, at 127. The first widely documented patent 
pool in the United States arose in the sewing machine industry in 1856. See Merges, supra note 90, at 
1342. In the late twentieth century, patent pools arose to facilitate the assembly of digital standards, 
including MPEG video. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., DOJ, to Gerrard 
R. Beeney, Esquire, Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) [hereinafter MPEG-2 Business Review 
Letter], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf. For an analytical discussion 
of the antitrust implications of patent pools, see Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 
AM. ECON. REV. 691 (2004). 
108  Economist Adam Smith coined the term “invisible hand” as a metaphor to describe how 
atomistic, self-interested actors can unintentionally achieve efficiency in the aggregate. See ADAM 
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 215–16 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2002) (1759) (“They are 
led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would 
have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus 
without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the 
multiplication of the species.” (footnote omitted)). The Market Correction Hypothesis can be 
distinguished from Smith’s “invisible hand” because it posits the conscious and deliberate pursuit of 
shared goals by small groups of private actors. 
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1. The Medicines Patent Pool.—Today, the public sector is tackling a 
patent gridlock dilemma that is quite literally a matter of life and death. 
Experts believe that in the developing world, the health of millions of HIV 
sufferers depends on the creation of new pediatric antiretroviral drugs 
(ARVs) and so-called “fixed dose” ARVs that combine several medications 
into a single pill.109 A former director of the World Health Organization has 
called the ongoing lack of these drugs a “global health emergency.”110 
Developing fixed-dose ARVs presents a textbook case of “horizontal” 
patent gridlock: each pill contains multiple drugs, usually patented by 
different companies.111 Because licensing the necessary patents presents 
high transaction costs and opportunities for holdouts, the demand for fixed-
dose ARVs in developing countries remains unfulfilled.112 Aggravating the 
challenge is the fact that pharmaceutical companies are often reluctant to 
license their patents at lower rates in developing nations because the reverse 
importation of cheap generic drugs into wealthy nations can undercut 
primary market sales.113 
Pediatric ARVs, by contrast, face a “vertical” form of patent gridlock. 
Multiple patented research tools sit upstream, blocking the path to 
downstream drug development. The difficulty of identifying and licensing 
these patents, combined with the low demand for childhood HIV drugs in 
 
109  See 152 CONG. REC. 14,436 (daily ed. July 14, 2006) (statement of Sen. William H. Frist) 
(discussing why single-pill fixed-dose treatments will have a “profound” impact on HIV–AIDS 
patients); ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GRP. ON AIDS, THE TREATMENT TIMEBOMB 25 (2009) 
[hereinafter TREATMENT TIMEBOMB], available at http://www.thebody.com/content/art52841.html 
(“There is an urgent need for new formulations of HIV medicines for children and for drugs that are 
easier to use such as small tablets.”); Amir Attaran, AIDS Medicine Patents Cause a Problem, FIN. 
TIMES (London), June 21, 2004, at 10 (explaining that “[u]nreliable supply chains in Africa make it” 
difficult for patients to receive regular, unbroken, and simultaneous doses of the three or more necessary 
medicines, and that combining the drugs into a single pill could solve this problem). 
110  Lee Jong-wook, Former Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Speech at Press Conference on AIDS 
Treatment Global Health Emergency (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.who.int/dg/lee/speeches/
2003/AIDS_treatment_pressconference/en (“Our failure to deliver antiretroviral treatment for AIDS to 
the millions of people who need it is a global health emergency.”). 
111  See supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining horizontal and vertical patent gridlock). 
112  While this problem affects developed countries as well, unreliable supply chains make it even 
more difficult to aggregate necessary drugs in Africa. See, e.g., Attaran, supra note 109 (explaining how 
the failure of pharmaceutical patent holders to cooperate has impeded the production of fixed-dose 
pills). 
113  The threat is so great that, in 2001, thirty-nine drug firms (and one individual) instituted a legal 
action to stop the government of South Africa from passing a law that would allow imports of generic 
HIV–AIDS drugs. See Pharm. Mfrs.’ Ass’n of S. Afr. v. Mandela, High Court of South Africa, 
Transvaal Provincial Division, No. 4183/98 (2001), available at http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/
MTCTPrevention/pharmace.txt. Only in the face of immense public pressure did the companies 
withdraw the suit in 2001. Ben Hirschler, Glaxo Gives Up Rights to AIDS Drugs in South Africa, 
REUTERS NEWMEDIA (Oct. 6, 2001), http://www.aegis.com/news/re/2001/RE011009.html (“39 
pharmaceutical companies backed down in a landmark court battle with the South African 
government.”). 
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wealthy nations (where most drug research takes place), have significantly 
hindered research.114 In poor nations, this transactional blockade has had 
grave consequences: The humanitarian organization Médecins Sans 
Frontières claims that the scarcity of pediatric ARVs significantly 
contributes to the high mortality rates of HIV sufferers under age two.115 
In 2008, a group of policymakers within the World Health 
Organization—The Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, 
Innovation, and Intellectual Property—suggested a solution: If 
pharmaceutical companies could be convinced to collectively license their 
patents, AIDS-related drugs could be researched, developed, and 
manufactured for use in poor countries.116 The plan was starkly simple. In 
exchange for royalties on product sales, patent holders would be asked to 
extend licenses to drug developers to facilitate research and development on 
pediatric ARV formulations and production of fixed-dose pills.117 Soon after 
the idea was proposed, UNITAID, an independent agency hosted by the 
World Health Organization, made plans for launching and administering the 
effort.118 
U.K. politicians and officials were supportive. In January 2009, over 
150 members of the U.K. Parliament (MPs) signed a parliamentary petition 
applauding UNITAID’s proposed patent pool and calling on pharmaceutical 
 
114  In the United States and Europe, there is a nearly 0% rate of HIV infections among children 
under age fifteen. UNAIDS, UNICEF, A CALL TO ACTION: CHILDREN: THE MISSING FACE OF AIDS 6 
(2005); see also TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 109, at 25 (“There is a lack of investment into 
medicines that are appropriate for children, because of the very limited commercial, developed country 
market for them.”); Brenda Waning et al., The Global Pediatric Antiretroviral Market: Analyses of 
Product Availability and Utilization Reveal Challenges for Development of Pediatric Formulations and 
HIV/AIDS Treatment in Children, 10 BMC PEDIATRICS 2010 74, 75 (2010) (highlighting the near-
elimination of HIV in children from the United States and Europe and the corresponding minimal 
demand for pediatric ARVs in these markets as a strong disincentive to the development). 
115  See Children Being 2eglected in AIDS Fight, Says MSF, MÉDECINS SANS 
FRONTIÈRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (July 13, 2004), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/
news/article.cfm?id=712&cat=field-news; Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without 
Borders, Drug Companies Leave Children with AIDS to Fend for Themselves (Nov. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=1628. 
116  Cf. World Health Assembly, WHO, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA61.21, annex 14 (May 24, 2008), available at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf (recommending examining “the feasibility 
of voluntary patent pools of upstream and downstream technologies to promote innovation of and access 
to health products and medical devices”). 
117  See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 109, at 28 (discussing patent sharing as a vehicle for 
facilitating the development of drugs that do not yet exist). 
118  The Medicines Patent Pool Initiative, UNITAID (Mar. 2009), http://www.unitaid.eu/images/
projects/PATENT_POOL_ENGLISH_15_may_REVISED.pdf (describing how the UNITAID pool 
would work); see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Effort for Lower Drug Prices Would Focus on Gaining 
Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at F6 (“[UNITAID] is endorsing the creation of a panel of experts to 
explore the feasibility of a ‘patent pool.’”). 
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companies to participate.119 In a March 2009 parliamentary hearing, an MP 
urged pharmaceutical companies “to respond positively” to the proposed 
initiative and to cooperate in order to improve access to HIV/AIDS drugs.120 
In a BBC interview conducted that summer, the United Kingdom’s 
International Development Minister echoed that sentiment, stating: “The 
pharmaceutical industry has an opportunity to act now to help prevent 
future human catastrophe. It is time for them to state their clear 
commitment to make new HIV medicines affordable to those who need 
them most, by working with [UNITAID] to develop a patent pool.”121 
Leading up to the pool’s launch, industry support was weak.122 GSK, 
the holder of several key ARV patents, told a group within the U.K. 
parliament in 2009 that it did not plan to contribute its patents to the 
project.123 (As of this writing, GSK continues to refuse to participate in the 
effort despite mounting public pressure.)124 ViiV Healthcare, a joint venture 
between GSK and Pfizer, also responded coldly.125 Citing these holdouts, 
commentators from the fields of law and medicine urged world 
governments to more actively push patent holders to share.126 
 
119  Early Day Motion 1553—HIV Treatments and Children, PARLIAMENT.UK (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2008-09/1553. 
120  25 Mar. 2009, PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2009) 289 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090325/debtext/90325-0001.htm#
column_289. 
121  Drug Firms ‘Must Pool Patents,’ BBC NEWS (July 15, 2009, 15:30 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8150457.stm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122  Some drug companies have made positive statements to the press. For example, pharmaceutical 
company Gilead Sciences stated: “We believe if structured appropriately, UNITAID’s patent pool can 
play a critical role in expanding access to antiretroviral treatments for patients around the world.” 
Andrew Jack, HIV ‘Pool’ Adds to Pressure on Drug Groups, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2009, at 16 
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/561186aa-e998-11de-
9f1f-00144feab49a.html#axzz1cgYKXB7c. 
123  TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 109, at 28–29 (noting GSK’s refusal in the face of “strong 
political pressure”). 
124  See, e.g., Philippe Douste-Blazy & Jorge Bermudez, Correspondence, GSK: Please Extend 
Patent Pool to AIDS Drugs, 373 LANCET 1339 (2009) (“We invite . . . GSK to contribute to the 
UNITAID medicines patent pool initiative and really join the sea change in the provision of medicines 
to people in developing countries.”); Kate Kelland, Some Drug Firms Keen, Others Reluctant on AIDS 
Pool, REUTERS (July 21, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/21/us-aids-drugs-
pool-idUSTRE66K2ZP20100721. 
125  Kelland, supra note 124 (reporting on ViiV Healthcare’s statements opposing the Medicines 
Patent Pool). 
126  See, e.g., E. Richard Gold & Jean-Frédéric Morin, Correspondence, The Missing Ingredient in 
Medicine Patent Pools, 374 LANCET 1329, 1330 (2009); cf. Ellen ‘t Hoen, Correspondence, 
Pharmaceutical Companies and the U2ITAID Patent Pool, 375 LANCET 30 (2010) (purporting to 
correct some of the statements made by Richard Gold and Jean-Frédéric Morin). In an editorial, The 
Lancet urged MPs to offer more vocal support for the idea of aggregating AIDS-related patents. 
Editorial, Political Activism 2eeded for Patent Pools for HIV Drugs, 374 LANCET 266 (2009). 
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UNITAID launched the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) in December 
2009,127 and the MPP became an independent, nonprofit foundation in 
September 2010.128 Press materials on the MPP’s website stated that the 
project’s goal was to facilitate the cheap production of existing drugs, as 
well as the development of new fixed-dose formulations and pediatric 
drugs.129 In this way, the resulting pool would straddle the divide between 
lowering the cost of producing existing drugs and encouraging research on 
drugs that do not yet exist. The MPP’s first step toward this goal was to 
focus public and political pressure on the pharmaceutical industry. In 
December 2010, the MPP sent public letters to ten pharmaceutical 
companies asking for licenses on specific target drugs.130 Some of these 
drugs were patented in wealthy nations where patents hold greater relative 
economic value, leading a WIPO official interviewed for this Article to 
opine, “The MPP might be more successful if it focused on [soliciting 
patented drugs in] only the least developed nations, rather than pushing 
hard for Brazil and India.”131 
As of this writing, the MPP still lacks widespread support from patent 
holders but there are signs of progress. In October 2010, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) agreed to contribute a set of patents covering the 
drug darunavir to the MPP on a royalty-free basis.132 Ellen ‘t Hoen, the 
MPP’s Executive Director, applauded this action but noted that “[t]he 
practical usefulness in the short term of this particular license is not very 
big” because the necessary patents covering distribution of the drug are still 
held by outside entities.133 (All of the donated patents were granted in 
 
127  U2ITAID Approves Patent Pool, UNITAID (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.unitaid.eu/en/
resources/news/237-unitaid-approves-patent-pool.html. 
128  Memorandum of Understanding between the World Health Org. and the Medicines Patent Pool 
Found. (Sept. 17, 2010), available at http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/content/download/208/1199/
version/3/file/MemorandumOfUnderstanding_MedicinesPatentPoolFoundation_14Sept2010.pdf 
(detailing the World Health Organization’s commitment to a five-year funding obligation). 
129  See, e.g., The Medicines Patent Pool: Stimulating Innovation, Improving Access, MEDICINES 
PATENT POOL (Jan. 2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/content/download/311/2031/version/1/
file/FACTSHEET+FINAL+EB.pdf (stating that the MPP aims to lower the prices of existing drugs and 
foster “the development of better-adapted formulations for developing country contexts, such as 
medicines for children” and fixed-dose formulations). 
130  Medicines Patent Pool in 2egotiations with Key HIV Medicines Patent Holders, MEDICINES 
PATENT POOL (July 2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/Company-Engagement 
(“On 1 December 2010, the Medicines Patent Pool sent out letters to key patent holders inviting them to 
formally begin negotiations to license their HIV/medicines patents to the Pool . . . .”). 
131  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #9 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
132  See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., 2ational Institutes of Health Licenses Its Patent on a 2ew Drug for 
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at D6; see also MEDS. PATENT POOL FOUND., Public Health Service 
2on-Exclusive Patent License Agreement (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/content/
download/214/1227/version/1/file/MPPF+Patent+License+Full+Executed+%28Sept+2010%29-NS.pdf 
(reflecting that the NIH license is royalty-free). 
133  Asher Mullard, Straight Talk with. . . Ellen ‘t Hoen, 16 NATURE MED. 1351, 1351 (2010), 
available at http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v16/n12/pdf/nm1210-1351.pdf. 
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nations where research, development, and manufacturing have traditionally 
taken place, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and 
nineteen high-income member states of the European Patent Office.)134 
Hoen added, however, that the license does allow licensees “to do some 
research with the protease inhibitor darunavir.”135 
In July 2011, the pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences agreed to 
license patents covering four HIV drugs—tenofovir, emtricitabine, 
cobicistat, and elvitegravir—to the MPP.136 The license allowed for 
production of the four drugs in over one hundred low-income nations. 
Officials in the United Kingdom and the United States applauded Gilead 
and encouraged other drug companies to follow suit. The Minister of 
International Development for the United Kingdom remarked, “The United 
Kingdom has been a strong supporter of the Medicines Patent Pool from 
day one. We welcome the news of their first pharmaceutical company 
licence.”137 An advisor within the White House Office of Science and 
Technology commented, “We hope additional public and private patent 
holders will explore voluntary licenses with the Medicines Patent Pool as 
one of many innovative ways to help improve the availability of medicines 
in developing countries.”138 
As of this writing, it is too early to tell if the MPP will facilitate 
meaningful drug research and development. But in view of this initiative’s 
origins and ongoing support in the public sector, it seems likely that 
continued governmental support will play an important role in the MPP’s 
future. 
2. The Pool for Open Innovation Against 2eglected Tropical 
Diseases.—As the Medicines Patent Pool continues to take form, 
another patent licensing initiative, The Pool for Open Innovation Against 
Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD Pool), reveals a different interplay 
between public policy and private patent licensing. Unlike the MPP, the 
NTD Pool is not motivated directly by policymakers but rather is designed 
to leverage government vouchers to encourage participation. 
 
134  See Current Licenses, MEDS. PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/
Current-Licences (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
135  Mullard, supra note 133 (discussing the need to get Johnson & Johnson on board, as they 
possess patents necessary to manufacture the drug). 
136  Press Release, Medicines Patent Pool, Medicines Patent Pool Signs License Agreement with 
Gilead to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Medicines (July 12, 2011), available at http://www.
medicinespatentpool.org/content/download/484/2863/version/1/file/FINAL+Press+Release+-
+Medicines+Patent+Pool+First+Pharma+Licence%5B1%5D.pdf. 
137  Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
138  Hillary Chen, Medicines Patent Pool Agreement with Gilead a Key Milestone, OFF. SCI. & 
TECH. POL’Y BLOG (July 12, 2011, 11:12 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/07/12/medicines-
patent-pool-agreement-gilead-key-milestone. 
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Originally formed by GSK in 2009 and currently administered by the 
nonprofit BIO Ventures for Global Health (BVGH), the NTD Pool is 
targeted at creating new treatments for sixteen tropical diseases, including 
malaria, leprosy, and tuberculosis.139 Executives and lawyers within BVGH 
who were interviewed for this Article explained that the NTD Pool is 
entirely aimed at encouraging the development of new drugs—unlike the 
MPP, which is aimed at drug production as well as research.140 In part, the 
need for this research reflects the fact that the targeted diseases have a low 
incidence in wealthy nations where drug research typically takes place.141 
The NTD Pool’s focus on researching new drugs, rather than on 
lowering the cost of manufacturing drugs that already exist, may explain 
why the effort has already gathered significant support from major research 
institutions, including MIT, University of California, Berkeley, and 
California Institute of Technology. As the director of technology licensing 
at a participating institution noted, patents are asserted less frequently 
during early-stage research than during later stages of product 
development.142 Another lawyer interviewed noted that there is likely low 
commercial demand fueling the research of tropical diseases in the targeted 
nations.143 Similar observations have led some pundits to criticize the NTD 
Pool as solving a problem that does not exist. A founder of a prominent 
nonprofit drug campaign commented to the 2ew York Times that 
assembling a patent pool of drugs on neglected diseases was “a bit silly” 
because patent suits over those rights are rare.144 
Setting such criticisms aside, insiders interviewed for this Article 
revealed an interesting and subtle motivation that may draw licensees to the 
NTD Pool: the promise of obtaining FDA Priority Review Vouchers 
(PRVs). Since 2007, the FDA has offered PRVs to companies that obtain 
FDA approval for products aimed at tropical diseases.145 The vouchers 
 
139  Press Release, BIO Ventures for Global Health, BIO Ventures for Global Health Chosen to 
Administer the GSK and Alnylam Intellectual Property Pool (Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://
ntdpool.org/news/releases/bio-ventures-global-health-chosen-administer-gsk-a. The full list is 
“tuberculosis, malaria, blinding trachoma, buruli ulcer, cholera, dengue/dengue haemorrhagic fever, 
racunculiasis, fascioliasis, human African trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, leprosy, lymphatic filariasis, 
onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis, soil transmitted helminthiasis and yaw.” Id. 
140  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #7 (Feb. 7, 2011). 
141  See Audrey Huang & Chris Weber, The Health of 2ations: Open-Source Research and the 
Economics of Life and Death in the Developing World, 7 BERKELEY SCI. REV., Fall 2004, at 45, 47, 
available at http://sciencereview.berkeley.edu/articles/issue7/disease.pdf (“Of the 1,393 new drugs 
approved in the United States between 1975 and 1999, only 13 treat tropical diseases.”). 
142  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #4 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
143  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #5 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
144  Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Ally for the Poor in an Unlikely Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at D1 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
145  FDA Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 1102, 121 Stat. 823, 972–74 (codified at 
21 U.S.C. § 360n (2006)). Significantly, the USPTO recently sought public comments on a similar plan 
that would extend fast-track reexamination vouchers for companies that pursued “technologies and 
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could be used to obtain expedited FDA review on future products of the 
holder’s choosing, or alternatively, they could be transferred.146 One lawyer 
from a participating research institution stated, “By shaving months off of 
FDA approval wait times, the vouchers can be worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars to drug developers.”147 The NTD Pool’s designers hoped that by 
taking some of the legal uncertainty out of conducting drug research, the 
effort would make it easier for researchers to apply for PRVs. Emphasizing 
the significant draw that such vouchers could hold for the NTD Pool itself, 
one lawyer opined, “The whole pool is geared toward FDA Priority Review 
Vouchers.”148 Administrators at BVGH confirmed this view, noting that the 
effort was “certainly designed with PRVs in mind,” and calling them “an 
important incentive” for potential licensees to participate.149 
As with the MPP, it remains to be seen whether the NTD Pool will 
facilitate valuable drug research and development. On the one hand, the 
effort has gathered hundreds of patents from several important academic 
research institutions.150 On the other hand, despite its branding, this pool for 
“open innovation” is not truly open to all takers. The NTD Pool’s 
guidelines explain that the licensed patents may not be used without the 
explicit permission of BVGH, which will conduct formal inquiries before 
granting permission.151 Ultimately, then, the pool’s future may depend in 
large part on whether it can effectively piggyback on the FDA’s voucher 
program aimed at encouraging cures for rare and tropical diseases. 
3. The S2P Consortium.—The SNP Consortium, a private project 
launched in the late 1990s that complemented the U.S. government’s 
preexisting efforts to build a database of valuable genetic information, 
illustrates yet another form of interplay between government actors and 
private industry.152 During the mid- to late-1990s, medical researchers 
hoped to unlock the secrets to human disease and responsiveness to drugs 
by comparing small variations in DNA—the tight coils of chemical 
blueprints found in human cells.153 These DNA variations, called “single 
nucleotide polymorphisms” (SNPs), however, are useful research tools only 
 
licensing behavior that addresses humanitarian needs.” Request for Comments on Incentivizing 
Humanitarian Technologies and Licensing Through the Intellectual Property System, 75 Fed. Reg. 
57,261 (filed Sept. 17, 2010). 
146  § 1102 (discussing priority review and transferability of the vouchers). 
147  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #4 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
148  Id. 
149  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #7 (Feb. 7, 2011). 
150  See How the Pool Works: User FAQs, POOL FOR OPEN INNOVATION, http://www.ntdpool.org/
pages/for-users/faqs (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
151  See id. (discussing eligibility for licensing). 
152  See generally GARY ZWEIGER, TRANSDUCING THE GENOME 177–89 (2001) (discussing the 
formation of the SNP Consortium and the 1990s-era of SNP scientific research more generally). 
153  See id. 
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when aggregated in large numbers.154 Recognizing this fact, researchers and 
business leaders alike feared that, by making collection of the requisite 
large numbers of SNPs difficult and costly, the widespread patenting of 
SNPs could spawn a new research anticommons that would stifle drug 
research and development.155 
Private companies weren’t the only ones concerned. In 1996, the NIH 
publicly discouraged the biomedical industry from seeking patents on 
human genes altogether.156 The NIH also stressed to grant applicants “the 
importance of making information about SNPs readily available to the 
research community.”157 Going further, the NIH advised that it would factor 
the adequacy of applicant data-sharing plans into grant decisions and that it 
would monitor the patenting behavior of grantees.158 
The U.S. government also took direct steps to avoid the rise of an SNP 
anticommons by creating a database to catalog SNPs. In December 1997, 
the NIH funded and managed the formation of a new database called 
“dbSNP,” which was designed to hold between 60,000 and 160,000 
SNPs.159 A respected biologist who helped design the database stated at the 
time that the effort aimed to prevent researchers from becoming “ensnared 
in a mesh of patents and licenses.”160 By 1999, various NIH agencies had 
contributed approximately $30 million to the project.161 
Following on the heels of the government’s initiative and the NIH’s 
hortatory messages regarding gene patenting, private firms launched a 
similar effort in 1999. The plan called for the creation of a new entity, the 
“SNP Consortium,” that, like the dbSNP, would place SNPs in the public 
domain and thereby defeat third-party patent claims.162 The SNP 
 
154  See id. at 177, 186. 
155  See id. at 177–78 (noting that private pharmaceutical companies were concerned about the 
propertization of SNPs); see also, e.g., Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property 
Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons 
Hypothesis 25, 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005) (finding 
detrimental impact of patents on scientific publishing). 
156  See 2HGRI Policy Regarding Intellectual Property of Human Genomic Sequence, NAT’L HUM. 
GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 9, 1996), http://www.genome.gov/10000926; see also Eliot Marshall, 
‘Playing Chicken’ Over Gene Markers, 278 SCI. 2046, 2047 (1997) (noting that academics were 
“worried that private companies wielding new technologies for scanning the genome [would] snap up 
the SNPs . . . and patent them”). 
157  Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 307. 
158   Id. 
159  See ZWEIGER, supra note 152, at 177; Eliot Marshall, Drug Firms to Create Public Database of 
Genetic Mutations, 284 SCI. 406, 406 (1999) [hereinafter Marshall, Drug Firms]; Marshall, supra note 
156. 
160  ZWEIGER, supra note 152, at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161  Id. (noting that the project’s founder had solicited $30 million from a consortium of eighteen 
NIH agencies). 
162  Id. at 177–78 (indicating that both projects aimed to prevent researchers from being “held 
hostage to commercial databases” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Consortium officially launched in April 1999 with the support of ten large 
pharmaceutical companies.163 At the time, the Director of the National 
Human Genome Research Institution described this private effort as “nicely 
complementary” to the NIH’s preexisting database created in 1997.164 
Paradoxically, the SNP Consortium defeated the threat of patents by 
embracing the patent system. Rather than merely publishing SNPs, the 
group obtained SNP patents that it then transferred to the public domain.165 
The SNP Consortium did this by drafting patent applications with statutory 
invention registrations (SIRs) to disclaim rights.166 Robert Merges has noted 
the advantages of this approach over publishing innovations to the public. 
For example, the SIRs are more likely to meet the “enablement” 
requirement of prior art because they are drafted by patent attorneys.167 As 
Jorge Contreras has observed: “This approach ensured that the 
Consortium’s discoveries would act as prior art defeating subsequent third-
party patent applications, with a priority date extending back to the initial 
filings.”168 
By most accounts, the SNP Consortium was a success. By February 
2001, the organization had placed 1.42 million SNPs in the public 
domain.169 Instead of spending an estimated $250 million to identify 
150,000 SNPs, the shared cost of the SNP Consortium amounted to $44 
million and yielded 1.8 million SNPs.170 All of these SNPs were later 
merged with those in the dbSNP database and made freely available to the 
public.171 
 
163  Id. at 177. 
164  Marshall, Drug Firms, supra note 159 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
165  In this way, the SNP Consortium was different from a traditional patent pool or patent 
commons—rather than licensing patents, the group defeated them. 
166  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: 
A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358, 2365–69 (2000) (discussing the SNP 
Consortium’s use of SIRs, including the organization’s novel strategy of delaying release of SNPs as 
long as possible to create uncertainty for those seeking to propertize related data). 
167  Merges, supra note 27, at 194–95. 
168  Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the Design of the Genome 
Commons, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 97 (2011). 
169  Thomas A. Hemphill, Preemptive Patenting, Human Geonomics, and the US Biotechnology 
Sector: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights with Societal Welfare, 25 TECH. SOC’Y 337, 345 (2003). 
170  J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for 
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter–Spring 2003, at 315, 458; see also Marshall, Drug Firms, supra note 159 (reporting the initial 
goal); Merges, supra note 27, at 190 (reporting the ultimate figures). 
171  See dbS2P Data Origins, NAT’L CENTER. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9691 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (reporting that the SNP Consortium’s 
database is “no longer growing,” and that the dbSNP “should contain all of their SNPs”); see also S.T. 
Sherry et al., dbS2P: The 2CBI Database of Genetic Variation, 29 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 308, 308–11 
(2001). 
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Like the MPP and the NTD Pool, the SNP Consortium emerged amidst 
public and private efforts aimed at the same goal of facilitating research. 
Challenging the Market Correction Hypothesis, which envisions collective 
patent licensing as an entirely private response to the government’s 
provision of patent rights, this episode shows that government actors have 
played a meaningful role in motivating private industry to collectively 
depropertize the patent landscape.172 
4. The Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association.—A glimpse even further 
backward in time to the fierce aerial battles of World War I demonstrates an 
even more direct example of government-inspired patent sharing. In the 
first decade of the twentieth century, several different companies held the 
multiple patents necessary to manufacture airplanes.173 Protracted litigation 
between the primary patent holders, Orville Wright and Glenn Curtiss, 
began in 1909 and dragged into the summer of 1914 when combat in 
Europe erupted.174 In the view of some historians, the patent gridlock that 
resulted from this dispute significantly impeded innovation in the American 
avionics industry.175 Reluctant to take on new contracts, nearly all aircraft 
manufactures raised their prices in anticipation of potential future 
lawsuits.176 As fighting in Europe worsened and America’s involvement 
seemed likely, the U.S. government’s demand for airplanes increased. The 
patent blockade cried out for a solution. 
 
172  One individual directly involved with the SNP Consortium who was interviewed for this Article 
reported that the project was not patterned after the government’s preexisting initiative. Rather, the 
source opined that the SNP Consortium was private industry’s response to design shortcomings in the 
government’s SNP database. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #9 (July 11, 2011). This 
viewpoint contrasts somewhat with the statements that the director of the governmental effort made to 
Science magazine that the SNP Consortium was “nicely complementary.” See supra note 164 and 
accompanying text. Both sources agree, however, that the SNP Consortium was motivated by the 
government’s earlier efforts. 
173  See, e.g., George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement, 
31 J.L. & ECON. 227, 230–31 (1988). 
174  Id. at 231–32 (explaining that the Wrights sued Curtiss in 1909 and eventually won the suit in 
the summer of 1914). The suit began when the Wrights read an article in Scientific American describing 
Curtiss’ flight of an experimental aircraft he called “June Bug.” CECIL R. ROSEBERRY, GLENN CURTISS 
115 (1991). On July 20, Orville Wright wrote Curtiss a letter explaining that June Bug’s design likely 
infringed their U.S. Patent No. 821,393. Id. 
175  See, e.g., Bittlingmayer, supra note 173, at 232 (“[S]ome firms were reluctant to take contracts 
because of the threat of patent infringement suits.”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 95, at 890–91 (noting 
the corrosive impact of the Wright patent on innovation). 
176  See Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Aeronautics, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICS (1918), in 8 AERIAL AGE WKLY. 128, 129 (Sept. 30, 1918) 
(“In January, 1917, the War and Navy Departments called the attention of the Advisory Committee to 
the prohibitive prices of aircraft charged by the various aircraft manufacturers, attributing these prices to 
the extra item of royalty added by each firm in anticipation of infringement suits by owners of alleged 
basic aeronautic patents . . . .”). 
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In January 1917, three months before America declared war, a small 
committee of experts appointed by President Wilson looked into the patent 
problem and proposed a novel solution: The holders of all necessary aircraft 
patents would transfer their rights to a licensing corporation called the 
Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA).177 The MAA would be open to 
anyone who wished to use the Wright–Curtiss designs for a $1000 initiation 
fee and a nominal licensing fee of $200 per aircraft built.178 These funds 
were to be distributed primarily between the Wright and Curtiss interests 
until each received a sum of $2,000,000 or their key patents expired.179 In 
this respect, the pool effectuated a settlement agreement between the 
Wright and Curtiss interests that would permit airplanes to be constructed. 
To encourage future innovation, the MAA also included a grant-back 
provision that applied to after-acquired patents.180 Members of the 
association that developed and patented new designs were compensated at a 
rate determined by an internal Board of Arbitration.181 By the terms of the 
MAA, royalties on after-acquired patents were only available for an 
invention that: 
secures the performance of a function not before known to the art, or 
constitutes an adaptation for the first time to commercial use of an invention 
known to the industry to be desirable of use but not used because of lack of 
adaptation, or is otherwise of striking character or constitutes a radical 
departure from previous practice, or if either the price paid therefor or the 
amount expended in developing the same is such as to justify such 
compensation . . . .182 
When disputes arose, they were handled internally—there would be no 
recourse to the courts.183 
As with the present-day MPP, initial industry support for the MAA 
was weak.184 The parties opposed the plan vehemently, asserting that they 
deserved higher royalties, but “patriotic impulses” and government pressure 
 
177  See, e.g., id. (discussing the government’s crucial role in identifying the aircraft patent problem 
and a government advisory committee’s suggestion of the cross-licensing association that became the 
MAA); End Patent Wars of Aircraft Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1917, at 5 (discussing the history and 
operation of the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association). 
178  See, e.g., Bittlingmayer, supra note 173, at 232–33. 
179  Id. 
180  A copy of the original agreement was reproduced in A Bill Providing for the Recording of Patent 
Pooling Agreements and Contracts with the Commissioner of Patents: Hearing on H.R. 4523 Before the 
H. Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong. App. 3 at 3058–125 (1935) [hereinafter MAA License Agreement]. 
181  Id. at 3065. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 3078. 
184  See Aircraft Builders Deny Monopoly Aim, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1917, at 11 (discussing 
criticisms of the MAA). 
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eventually led both Wright and Curtiss to agree.185 Even so, gaining the 
support of major industry stakeholders remained a challenge all its own. 
Some within the industry believed that the MAA was not designed to 
enhance cumulative innovation in the industry, but rather only to privately 
benefit Wright and Curtiss.186 
These and similar protests led the Attorney General of the United 
States to conduct a deep investigation of the MAA pool with the assistance 
of lawyers skilled in patent and antitrust law.187 After careful review, the 
Attorney General issued an official opinion that the MAA was “not in 
contravention of the antitrust laws of the United States.”188 This assessment 
was based on several factors, chief of which were that anyone could license 
the key Wright–Curtiss patents on reasonable terms and that members of 
the association were free to license outside the pool if they wished.189 With 
many of its concerns dispelled, industry support developed, and the MAA 
patent pool quickly gathered steam.190 Overnight, the government had 
helped transform an industry into a unit. 
Antitrust regulators continued to give the MAA clean bills of health for 
decades.191 In 1972, however, a court determined that, just as some initial 
detractors had feared it might, the association was slowing innovation in the 
aircraft business and benefiting only its owners.192 In 1975, the MAA was 
dismantled in accordance with a consent decree.193 
The MAA episode challenges the Market Correction Hypothesis’s 
depiction of patent sharing as a private response to government “errors” in 
the initial apportionment of patent rights. What this episode shows, rather, 
 
185  Manufacturers Aircraft Association, Inc., Organized, 3 AVIATION & AERONAUTICAL 
ENGINEERING 43, 43 (1917) (“When these negotiations were started the task of bringing all of the parties 
interested together seemed insurmountable, but actuated by patriotic impulses it was finally 
agreed . . . that the [MAA agreement would] be completed.”). 
186  Interestingly, Leon Cammen, the Vice President of the Aeronautical Society of America, argued 
that the MAA would impede innovation and would “keep the airplane in its present state of 
imperfection.” Aircraft Builders Deny Monopoly Aim, supra note 184. The topic of patent pooling as a 
cure for litigation is discussed in greater depth infra Part II.B. 
187  See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 488–89 (1933) (recounting this 
history). 
188  Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n—Antitrust Laws, 31 Op. Att’y. Gen. 166 (1917). 
189  Id. at 170–71. 
190  See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing 
Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 660–61 (2010) (“Largely because of 
this functioning commons of patented inventions, airplanes were built, and the war was won.”). 
191  See Bittlingmayer, supra note 173, at 234–35 (noting that the MAA received “numerous clean 
bills of health”). 
192  See Plane Makers Hit by Antitrust Suit over Inventions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1972, at 3 
(reporting on a Justice Department civil suit alleging antitrust violations). 
193  See United States v. Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, No. 72-Civ-1307, 1975 WL 814, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
12, 1975) (ordering the termination of cross-licenses); see also Airplane Makers Agree to Settle ‘72 
Antitrust Suit, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1975, at 15 (discussing agreement to end the MAA). 
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is how various government efforts, from the committee assembled by the 
President, to the Attorney General’s dismissal of antitrust concerns, 
succeeded in encouraging a reluctant industry to cooperate. Robert 
Merges’s earlier scholarship on the MAA supports this characterization.194 
When the MAA is compared to the other episodes discussed in this 
Part, a range of government involvement in collective patent licensing is 
apparent. The MAA was purely a government creation. The MPP, by 
contrast, emerged at the encouragement and prodding of policymakers and 
officials. The SNP Consortium was a private response to the government’s 
preexisting efforts to overcome a genomic anticommons. Finally, the NTD 
Pool was designed to piggyback on—and in so doing, further the goals of—
an FDA voucher program aimed at promoting drug development. 
B. Collective Responses to Litigation 
Just as government can influence patent sharing, so too can litigation. 
Patent holders seeking to settle or avoid costly lawsuits sometimes turn to 
collective invention sharing as a solution. The following initiatives are 
inherently concerned more with products that already exist (and are 
therefore vulnerable to patent assertion) than with those that have not yet 
been developed. As a result, some collective responses to 
overpropertization are driven more by avoidance of immediate litigation 
than by long-term promotion of innovation. 
1. The Open Invention 2etwork.—The use of collective patent 
sharing to defend software products from litigation is rooted in the open-
source computing movement of the 1980s.195 The introduction of affordable 
home computers such as the Apple Macintosh inspired a generation of 
hobbyists to explore the craft of writing software code.196 The risk of 
software copyright infringement, however, discouraged the development of 
any useful large-scale projects.197 To overcome this threat, a grassroots 
 
194  As early as 1999, Robert Merges observed that some patent pools have only formed with the 
help of government assistance. Merges, supra note 55, at 145–46. Other notable historical cases of 
government-inspired patent sharing exist. Following the First World War, the U.S. Navy encouraged the 
pooling of radio patents into what became the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). See Merges & 
Nelson, supra note 95, at 891–93 (discussing the formation of the RCA patent pool). 
195  The open-source computing movement embraced a set of methods and philosophies about 
software development that focused on collaboration. See generally ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL 
& THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (rev. ed. 
2001) (extolling the benefits of the open-source software movement including its importance as a driver 
and facilitator of innovation). Most open-source licenses eschew (and in fact prohibit) any restrictions 
on use or redistribution based on the belief that the benefits of sharing one’s innovations outweigh any 
costs. Id. at 132–34. 
196  Id. at 10–14 (discussing the rise of “microcomputers” during the 1980s). 
197  See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 154 (2001) (discussing 
programmer Richard Stallman’s belief that “the rise of proprietary software systems [w]as a severe 
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movement arose around the idea of so-called “free software”—i.e., software 
freed from most copyright protections.198 Key to the movement was an 
innovative type of copyright license that granted broad use rights to 
licensees who agreed to distribute the original work and any derivative 
works on the same terms.199 This “viral” nature of so-called open public 
licenses led to a flourishing of sophisticated “open-source” software 
programs on which businesses and consumers continue to rely—most 
notably, the Linux operating system.200 
In the late 1990s, open-source projects like Linux faced a new threat in 
the form of patent infringement litigation. Starting in 1998, a line of Federal 
Circuit decisions established that software is eligible for patent protection.201 
Because Linux was founded on an open public license that did not 
contemplate patent infringement, the new possibility of patent infringement 
suits cast a shroud of uncertainty over the operating system’s legal 
viability.202 
Experts believed that litigation was inevitable. As early as November 
1998, a key figure in the free software community predicted that 
“corporations hostile to open source will band together on this issue and 
form an organization to enforce their intellectual property rights against 
open source software.”203 In the years that followed, this fear was 
galvanized by the saber-rattling of large patent holders adverse to the open-
source movement. Microsoft Corporation representatives called open-
source software “a threat to our very system of capitalism,” and ominously 
noted, “The effect of patents and copyright in combating Linux remains to 
 
threat to freedom and creativity” and his contention that copyright law “impeded the development of the 
best possible software”). 
198  See, e.g., JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 77, 94, 
189 (2008) (discussing the free software philosophy, the potential complications posed by intellectual 
property protections, and the possible solutions generated by “open source” software development). 
199  See, e.g., Mark H. Webbink, Understanding Open Source Software, NEW S. WALES SOC’Y FOR 
COMPUTERS & L., https://www.nswscl.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95:
understanding-open-source-software&catid=23:march-2003-issue&Itemid=31 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) 
(explaining how open-source licensing under the original GNU Public License works). 
200  See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 60, at 371–74 & n.3 (discussing the power and potential of open-
source software development). 
201  See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (affirming the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for analyzing patentable subject matter 
and permitting software previously considered “too obvious” to be patented (quoting In re Alappat, 33 
F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 187, 201, 210–13 
(“Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has set software-specific precedents that essentially remove most 
restrictions on abstract claims in software.”); cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (stating 
that “machine-or-transformation” test is not the sole indicum of patentability). 
202  See, e.g., G2U General Public License, Version 1, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND. (Feb. 1989), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-1.0.html (containing no reference to patents). 
203  Bruce Perens, Preparing for the Intellectual Property Offensive, LINUXWORLD (Nov. 11, 1998), 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990225093703/http://www.linuxworld.com/linuxworld/lw-1998-11/lw-
11-thesource.html. 
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be investigated.”204 The open-source community took these threats 
seriously.205 
Amidst these looming concerns, a patent-sharing community was born. 
In 2005, IBM, which held a vested interest in Linux, approached the Novell 
software company with a strikingly simple plan to reduce the threat of 
litigation: They would convince a community of Linux-based software 
companies to agree not to sue one another for using Linux.206 This promised 
to create a community of nonassertion. At the same time, the organization 
itself would build a portfolio of Linux patents through targeted 
acquisitions.207 This portfolio would have defensive and offensive 
potentials. It would prevent key Linux patents from falling into the wrong 
hands and would simultaneously serve as a potential legal weapon against 
“those who attack Linux.”208 This sword-and-shield plan was officially 
launched as the Open Invention Network (OIN) in 2005.209 
The prominent Linux distributor Red Hat was one of the first 
companies to pledge its support to OIN.210 An attorney involved with the 
effort and interviewed for this Article noted, “Panic is a good motivator. 
Red Hat saw [OIN] as the fastest way to develop a defensive shield. They 
also [believed the effort would] reassure the open source community.”211 
For Linux distributors like Red Hat, “circling the wagons” in this manner 
had distinct appeal. Red Hat held only five patents at the time of OIN’s 
launch.212 Teaming up with larger patent holders such as Novell and IBM, 
the lawyer explained, gave Red Hat and its investors a much-needed sense 
of security.213 By contrast, IBM, which at the time was the single largest 
patent holder in the United States, saw the OIN as an opportunity to 
promote Linux as a viable competitor to the powerful incumbent, Microsoft 
Windows.214 
 
204  See Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
349, 371–72 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
205  Id.; see also Roger Parloff, Microsoft Takes On the Free World, FORTUNE, May 28, 2007, at 77 
(discussing Microsoft’s patent infringement claims). 
206  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #2 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
207  Id. 
208  See Frequently Asked Questions, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork
.com/press_faq.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
209  Steve Lohr, Company to Start Offering Free Use of Patents It Holds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2005, at C8. 
210  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #2 (Sept. 27, 2010). These founding members had 
different interests: IBM and Novell held many patents. Red Hat did not, so its reasons were mostly 
defensive. Sony and Philips, on the other hand, were shipping devices with Linux embedded. Id. 
211  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #2 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
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Today, OIN has the support and membership of over 200 companies, 
including Google, IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, and Sony.215 In the first 
fiscal quarter of 2010, the group reported that the number of new licensees 
was growing at a fast pace.216 Beyond the many patents held by its 
members, the group itself has purchased patents as well. Most notably, OIN 
acquired an important set of twenty-two Linux-related patents in early 
2010.217 Experts believe that these patents, which Microsoft sold to another 
organization in 2009, could have posed a significant threat to Linux had 
they fallen into the possession of patent trolls.218 
The OIN patent license, to which all members must agree, is primarily 
designed to prevent litigation rather than to increase innovation.219 This is 
reflected in the agreement’s broad scope. As mentioned earlier, OIN 
establishes a network of reciprocal nonassertion promises by which every 
member of the collective is permitted to use all Linux-related patents of any 
other member.220 Moreover, the agreement licenses to all members the 
patents owned by OIN itself.221 Under the terms of the license, members 
promise to “grant to each Licensee . . . a royalty-free, worldwide, 
nonexclusive, non-transferable license under [their] Patents for making, 
having made, using, importing, and Distributing any Linux System.”222 In 
return, OIN promises: “Open Invention Network® acquires patents and 
makes them available royalty-free to any company, institution or individual 
that agrees not to assert its patents against the Linux System.”223 As OIN 
 
215  See OI2 Community of Licensees, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.
openinventionnetwork.com/licensees.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
216  Open Invention 2etwork Reports Increase in Licensing Program in First Quarter, WIRELESS 
NEWS, Apr. 18, 2010, available at Factiva, Doc. No. WLNW000020100430e64i0001h (reporting that 
OIN signed forty new licensees during this period). 
217  See Nick Wingfield, Group of Microsoft Rivals 2ears Patent Deal in Bid to Protect Linux, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2009, at B1. 
218  Id. (defining “patent trolls” as entities “that don’t typically make products and exist primarily to 
earn money from lawsuits and settlements in patent cases” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 3, 159 (discussing patent trolls). 
219  Readers should take note that Linux is not itself a collective effort to further innovation in the 
field of computer science by depropertizing the IP landscape. Rather, Linux is a freely available 
computer operating system designed to allow users to run software applications. Thus, the OIN’s 
mission to protect Linux users and distributors from patent litigation is not inherently innovation-
enhancing. 
220  License Agreement, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/
pat_license_agreement.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter OI2 License Agreement]. 
221  Id. 
222  Id. (emphasis added). 
223  Open Invention 2etwork—Patents, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.
openinventionnetwork.com/patents.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (emphasis added). 
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defines the term, “The Linux System” does not include future software 
releases with new functionality.224 
This language has subtle but significant implications for OIN’s power 
to encourage innovation. As a lawyer who helped draft the agreement 
explained, by encompassing all member patents that relate to “the Linux 
System,” the agreement aims to defend Linux users and distributors from 
patent infringement.225 The license does not, however, require licensors to 
identify specific patents that fall within this broad definition.226 As a result, 
OIN does not deliver clear guidance to would-be innovators on their 
freedom to practice specific patents. Moreover, the definition of the “The 
Linux System” does not relate to future products with functionality that 
does not exist.227 When asked about this difference, the attorney interviewed 
candidly stated, “Some communities are freedom-to-operate driven, while 
others are driven by defensive needs.”228 Thus, in discord with the Market 
Correction Hypothesis, OIN seems designed to protect an existing product 
rather than to encourage the development of new ones. 
2. The Bessemer Association.—An earlier patent-sharing regime that 
facilitated the production of existing products rather than the development 
of future technologies arose in the American steel industry following the 
Civil War.229 In 1865, railroad companies were the most important 
purchasers of steel in the United States.230 Despite high demand, however, 
very few American companies understood the science of steelmaking well 
enough to produce it efficiently.231 As an apparent consequence, American 
steel was expensive and in short supply.232 
An enterprising young American named Alexander Holley traveled to 
England in 1862 in search of solutions.233 There, Holley met with an English 
 
224  See Linux Definitions, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/
pat_linuxdef.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter OI2 Linux Definitions]. 
225  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #2 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
226  See OI2 License Agreement, supra note 220. 
227  See OI2 Linux Definitions, supra note 224. 
228  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #2 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
229  See Alessandro Nuvolari, Collective Invention During the British Industrial Revolution: The 
Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 347, 360 (2004) (including the Bessemer 
Association in a discussion of patent pools that furthered collective innovation). 
230  See THOMAS J. MISA, A NATION OF STEEL xx (1999) (stating that railroads were “the single 
most important consumer[s] of steel in the era before automobiles”). 
231  See Peter B. Meyer, Episodes of Collective Invention 7 & fig.1, 8–10 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Working Paper No. 368, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=466880 (noting that imperfect knowledge of metallurgy in the United States 
during this period hindered production). 
232  See, e.g., JOHN O’SULLIVAN & EDWARD F. KEUCHEL, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 81 
(1993) (stating that during this period, “[s]teel was expensive and available only in relatively small 
quantities”). 
233  SIR HENRY BESSEMER, SIR HENRY BESSEMER, F.R.S. 338 (1905). 
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inventor named James Bessemer who had patented a method of passing air 
through molten iron that cheaply yielded large volumes of high quality 
steel.234 Holley licensed Bessemer’s patents, returned to New York, and 
established a plant to bring Bessemer steel to the American market.235 
Holley’s efforts were derailed, however, when American inventor 
William Kelly won an interference proceeding against the Bessemer patents 
and received a U.S. patent covering the key method of oxidizing molten 
steel.236 All the while, Holley still held the rights to practice other essential 
aspects of the Bessemer method. As a result, no single company possessed 
all of the necessary rights to produce Bessemer steel in the United States. It 
seemed, in Holley’s words, that “[l]itigation of a formidable character was 
imminent.”237 
But Holley and Kelly ultimately avoided a lengthy legal battle by 
cooperating. Out of court, the two patent holders agreed to pool their 
blocking patents under a new corporation called “the Pneumatic Steel 
Association,” or the Bessemer Association.238 For a licensing fee and a 
promise to grant back licenses to all follow-on innovations, any company 
could join the organization and gain the rights to produce Bessemer steel 
free from the risk of litigation.239 
In subsequent decades, the quality and quantity of American steel 
dramatically increased—proof, some may surmise, of the Bessemer 
Association’s power as an engine for cumulative innovation.240 But a deeper 
look tells a different story. First, historians have noted that important 
advances in steelmaking during this period likely stemmed from the rich 
culture of information sharing that existed outside of the Bessemer 
Association.241 Notably, the American Institute of Mining Engineers 
(TAIME) began publishing a journal in 1871 devoted to the science and 
practice of steelmaking.242 The journal, to which notable scientists and 
engineers contributed, contained detailed descriptions of new steelmaking 
 
234  Id. at 156–61 (giving a detailed firsthand description of this process and its genesis). 
235  Id. at 337–39. 
236  MISA, supra note 230, at 19–21. 
237  Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
238  See id. 
239  Meyer, supra note 231, at 11 (discussing the licensing structure and membership requirements of 
the Bessemer Association). 
240  But see Leonard H. Lynn, N. Mohan Reddy & John D. Aram, Linking Technology and 
Institutions: The Innovation Community Framework, 25 RES. POL’Y 91, 95 (1996) (explaining that, 
while the Bessemer Association lowered production costs of steelmaking, it likely impeded 
technological innovation). 
241  See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 231 (noting the role of trade journals in disseminating technical 
information during this period). 
242  See generally 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING ENGINEERS (1871) 
(providing information about the creation and purpose of the journal). 
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processes as well as discussions of experimental successes and failures.243 
Second, the high rate of job turnover among engineers in the steel industry 
naturally led to a great deal of valuable information sharing. As one 
historian noted, “the five or six top engineers of the industry [met 
frequently] to discuss common problems.”244 Third, Alexander Holley 
himself, considered by many to have been a brilliant and prolific engineer, 
independently published important technical information that likely spurred 
cumulative innovation.245 
There is no evidence showing that any significant advances in 
steelmaking during this period were the direct result of the Bessemer 
Association. In fact, some historians posit that the Bessemer Association 
was responsible for slowing innovation in the steel industry.246 Moreover, 
any innovation arguably facilitated by the Bessemer Association was short-
lived. By 1877, the Bessemer Association effectively stopped new members 
from joining and refused to renew the licenses of many existing members.247 
Licensing rates were raised, and the small number of remaining members 
collected huge profits and effectively controlled the market price of steel.248 
Ultimately then, it appears that like the OIN, the Bessemer Association was 
not designed to facilitate cumulative innovation but rather to clear a legal 
impasse that prevented the production of an existing product.249 As such, 
this example does not match the Market Correction Hypothesis, which 
predicts that private actors faced with an anticommons situation will 
collectively forgo the short-term benefits of patent ownership in exchange 
for the long-term benefits that flow from innovation. 
3. The Mines of Cornwall.—In the Earth’s ancient geological past, 
the slow collision of two continents formed a belt of mountains that today 
reaches from Portugal to the county of Cornwall on England’s 
 
243  See Meyer, supra note 231, at 8–10 (detailing exemplary contributions made to the journal). At 
the time, a similar periodical was also in wide circulation in England. See 1 J. IRON & STEEL INST. 
(1874). 
244  Meyer, supra note 231, at 12 (alteration in original) (quoting PETER TEMIN, IRON AND STEEL IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 133 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
245  See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 231, at 11. 
246  See, e.g., Lynn, Reddy & Aram, supra note 240, at 95 (“The U.S. industry lagged, however, 
when it came to product innovation, quality, and price to consumers. This too may have been an 
outcome of the strength of the Bessemer Association.”). 
247  See MISA, supra note 230, at 20–21; Thomas J. Misa, Controversy and Closure in Technological 
Change: Constructing “Steel,” in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY 124 (Wiebe E. Bijker & 
John Law eds., 1999); Meyer, supra note 231, at 12. 
248  See MISA, supra note 230, at 21 (discussing the deep and lasting anticompetitive impact of the 
Bessemer Association on steel pricing). 
249  From an economic perspective, this conclusion is not surprising. In the words of Carl Shapiro, 
“As a matter of economic theory, there is no reason to expect [that] two parties’ collective interests in 
settlement, and especially in the form of settlement they adopt, to coincide with the public interest, 
which includes consumer interests.” Shapiro, supra note 65, at 142 (emphasis omitted). 
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southernmost tip.250 In the late 1700s, the ridge of valuable minerals below 
Cornwall birthed a high-tech mining industry that made the region one of 
the most advanced engineering centers in the world.251 It was the Silicon 
Valley of its day.252 
Mining in Cornwall was lucrative but often unpredictable.253 Due to the 
region’s proximity to the English Channel, operations were frequently 
disrupted by underground floods.254 In a quest to safeguard profits and lives, 
the owners and operators of Cornwall’s mines (called “adventurers” at the 
time) searched for efficient ways to remove water from their tunnels.255 
For nearly seventy years, the most important technology used for 
draining mines in the region was the Newcomen steam engine.256 Designed 
and patented by Thomas Newcomen in 1712, the device was reliable, 
worked by a simple principle, and was relatively easy to maintain.257 The 
Newcomen engine’s high fuel consumption, however, made it very difficult 
to use in mines where natural fuel sources, such as coal, were not readily 
available.258 In 1769, Scottish inventor James Watt solved this problem with 
an ingenious modification to Newcomen’s design that drastically cut fuel 
consumption.259 Watt patented his modified engine and licensed it to mine 
adventurers in Cornwall on agreeable terms.260 
Before long, however, some mine owners felt that Watt’s licensing 
fees had become unfairly high.261 Frustrated, they enlisted local engineers to 
construct pirate engines that they put to work throughout the region.262 
 
250  See, e.g., B.E. Leveridge & A.J. Hartley, The Variscan Orogeny: The Development and 
Deformation of Devonian/Carboniferous Basins in SW England and South Wales, in THE GEOLOGY OF 
ENGLAND AND WALES 225 (Patrick J. Brenchley & Peter F. Rawson eds., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing the 
geologic history of the region). 
251  See, e.g., 2ation on Film—Drill and Blast, BBC HOME, http://www.bbc.co.uk/cornwall/
uncovered/stories/sept2003/nationonfilm.shtml (last updated Oct. 2003) (previewing the BBC television 
broadcast, 2ation on Film—Drill and Blast, that originally aired on October 7, 2003 (discussing the 
importance of Cornwall as an engineering center in the nineteenth century)). 
252  This analogy has been made by a number of scholars. See, e.g., CHARLES LEADBEATER, WE-
THINK 54 (2d ed. 2009). 
253  See Nuvolari, supra note 229, at 351–59. 
254  See id. (discussing mine flooding). 
255  Id. at 352–56. 
256  See id. at 352 (stating that the Newcommen engine was invented in 1712 and that Watt’s design, 
which replaced the Newcommen as the state of the art in mine-draining technology, came into use 
beginning in 1777). 
257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  Id. (emphasizing the incredible value gained by Watt’s addition of a separate condenser). 
260  Id. at 352–53. 
261  Id. at 353. 
262  Id. 
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Following a lengthy legal challenge, the courts affirmed the validity of 
Watt’s broad patent and enjoined use of the pirate devices.263 
After Watt’s victory in 1799 and the expiration of his patent in 1800, 
Cornwall mining entrepreneurs collectively organized against the patent 
system.264 In 1811, a group of mine “captains” agreed to place new steam 
engine designs in the public domain by way of a new trade journal.265 At the 
same time, most engineers stopped patenting their new designs—in part 
because business owners were boycotting patented designs and also because 
placement in the trade journal was good advertising for aspiring 
engineers.266 
Over the next thirty years, the average efficiency of steam engines 
steadily increased—a direct result, historians believe, of the decision among 
inventors in Cornwall to share designs and related technical information, 
rather than to litigate.267 Historical records from the period also reflect this 
view. As one mine entrepreneur wrote in 1830: 
[A]s, since the time of Boulton and Watt, no one who has improved our 
engines has reaped pecuniary reward, it is at least fair that they should have 
credit for their skill and exertion. We [adventurers] are not the partisans of any 
individual [engineer or engine maker], we avail ourselves of the assistance of 
many; and the great scale upon which we have to experiment, makes the result 
most interesting to us.268 
To conclude that the tale of Cornwall supports the Market Correction 
Hypothesis is appealing. Facially, this episode does appear to show “long-
term industry players rationally seek[ing] to constrain property rights 
protections in order to maximize the cumulative stream of innovation gains 
net of transaction costs,”269 as the theory predicts. But the peculiar 
economics of Cornwall’s mining industry reveal a more nuanced tale. Most 
mining entrepreneurs owned shares in their competitors’ operations.270 As a 
result, many adventurers directly profited from the aggregate performance 
of their local district as a whole as compared to the performance of 
neighboring mining districts.271 In the absence of this unique incentive 
 
263  Id. 
264  See id. at 353–55 (“The case of the Cornish pumping engine seems to be indeed an ‘exemplary’ 
case of collective invention.”). 
265  Id. at 354. 
266  Id. at 354, 357. 
267  See, e.g., id. at 354. 
268  John Taylor, Letter to the Editor, On the Duty of Steam-Engines in Cornwall, 7 PHIL. MAG. 424, 
431 (1830). 
269  Barnett, supra note 1, at 442. 
270  Nuvolari, supra note 229, at 356–57 (discussing the “cost book system,” a mode of profit-
sharing present in the Cornish mining economy, and noting that “[a]dventurers were usually not tied to 
the fortunes of a single mine but often acquired shares of different mine ventures”). 
271  Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 142 
structure, it is not at all clear that Cornwall would have blossomed into the 
community of innovation that it became. 
C. Charitable Communities 
The patent-sharing regimes discussed in this Part have a charitable 
aspect to them, suggesting that they are motivated more by social goals than 
by private gain. As with the litigation-inspired episodes discussed earlier, 
these examples reveal that the aim of a patent-sharing community can 
govern what it will accomplish. Here, broad philanthropic goals motivate 
the sharing of diverse sets of patents that are not necessarily interrelated and 
therefore not the basis for patent gridlock. Thus, while the following 
initiatives may be of significant social value, they do not support the Market 
Correction Hypothesis. 
1. The Eco-Patent Commons.—On its face, the problem of 
environmental harm seems almost too vast to tackle. It is a puzzle with 
political, economic, and social dimensions, the effects of which are as far-
reaching as global climate change and yet as immediate as the quality of 
water and air. Experts believe that behind all this complexity, however, lies 
a simple promise: cleaner technologies can help. Over the past two decades, 
world governments have worked in earnest to encourage so-called “green” 
innovation in the private sector. In the past year alone, the USPTO 
implemented a “fast track” program under which patent applications for 
environmentally friendly inventions will be processed more quickly than 
standard patents.272 Recognizing the need to encourage green technologies, 
some nations have called for treaties weakening the enforceability of 
patents related to ecological sustainability. In the 2008 United Nations 
Framework on Climate Change, for example, China pushed for weaker 
 
272  Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg. 
64,666 (Dec. 8, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, The U.S. Commerce 
Department’s Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Will Pilot a Program to Accelerate the 
Examination of Certain Green Technology Patent Applications (Dec. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/09_33.jsp. 
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protection of climate-related patents.273 U.S. lawmakers have introduced 
bills that explicitly reject this approach, however.274 
Against this backdrop, an unlikely champion of weaker patent 
enforcement has recently emerged. In 2008, IBM Corporation, the largest 
patent holder in the United States, led a collaboration to pool green patents 
on a royalty-free basis. The same year, the Eco-Patent Commons (EPC) was 
formally announced as a partnership among IBM, Pitney-Bowes, and Sony, 
with organizational support from the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development.275 
The EPC is open to any patent holder willing to donate 
environmentally beneficial innovations to the public without royalties. The 
EPC website explains the project’s mission: 
• To provide an avenue by which innovations and solutions may 
be easily shared to accelerate and facilitate implementation to 
protect the environment and perhaps lead to further 
innovation; 
 
273  See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Coop. Action Under the Convention, Bonn, F.R.G., June 1–12, 2009, Negotiating Text, ¶¶ 187–89, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/8 (May 19, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/
awglca6/eng/08.pdf (encouraging the development of “climate-friendly technologies” by proposing the 
removal of intellectual property “barriers to development and [the] transfer of technologies from 
developed to developing countr[ies]” or the exemption “from patent protection of climate-related 
technologies” for the least-developed countries); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, Addressing the 
Green Patent Global Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727, 1727 (2010) (“During 
climate treaty negotiations, developing countries like China have argued that patents limit their access to 
green technologies. Based on these submissions, the May 2009 United Nations climate treaty 
negotiating text contained proposals that weaken IP rights for green technologies.” (footnote omitted)). 
274  See H.R. REP. NO. 111-143, at 36 (2009); H.R. amend. 187 to H.R. 2410, H.R. REP. NO. 111-
143, at 53 (June 10, 2009) (amending Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, 
H.R. 2410, 111th Cong. § 1120a (2009)) (“[I]t shall be the policy of the United States that, with respect 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the President, the Secretary of State 
and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations should prevent any 
weakening of, and ensure robust compliance with and enforcement of, existing international legal 
requirements . . . for the protection of intellectual property rights related to energy or environmental 
technology . . . .”). This amendment reflects the view that patents play an important role in encouraging 
innovation—an opinion that is generally held by wealthy and developed nations. See Tove Iren S. 
Gerhardsen, IP Issues May Go to ‘Higher Political Level’ in Copenhagen Amid Difficulties, INTELL. 
PROP. WATCH (Dec. 9, 2009, 5:57 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/12/09/ip-issues-may-go-
to-%E2%80%98higher-political-level%E2%80%99-in-copenhagen-amid-difficulties (explaining that, 
by and large, developed countries view patents as an important incentive for innovation, while 
developing countries view them as an barrier). 
275  See Press Release, IBM, IBM and World Business Council for Sustainable Development Team 
with Nokia, Pitney Bowes and Sony to Establish Eco-Patent Commons (Jan. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/23280.wss (introducing the EPC and explaining how 
the plan originated); see also Marc Sandy Block, Eco-Patent Commons: Selected Patents Made 
Available to Benefit the Environment, IP LITIGATOR, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 25, 25–26 (discussing the 
history of the project). 
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• To promote and encourage cooperation and collaboration 
between businesses that pledge patents and potential users to 
foster further joint innovations and the advancement and 
development of solutions that benefit the environment.276 
This goal is achieved by requiring contributors to agree to the 
following patent nonassertion pledge: 
Accordingly, we irrevocably (except as specified below) pledge and covenant 
to you that we will not assert any of our listed patents (including any 
worldwide counterparts) against you for any infringing machine, manufacture, 
process, or composition of matter claimed in such listed patent(s) where such 
infringing item alone (or when included in a product or service) 
reduces/eliminates natural resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste 
generation or pollution, or otherwise provides environmental benefit(s).277 
Hence, the pool is aimed at the broad aggregation of patents rather than 
at any specific avenue of research or product development. Although the 
EPC pledge is not a binding contract, it is likely enforceable through the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel.278 
An obvious question is why patent holders would be at all motivated to 
participate in the EPC. After all, the group guarantees participants nothing 
in return for their pledges of nonassertion. An attorney closely involved 
with the project has suggested that licensors might simply be willing to act 
for the public good. “[T]he belief behind the Commons,” the attorney wrote 
in a recent journal article, “is that major patent holders in various 
industries have patents of moderate value that provide an environmental 
benefit . . . [and] recognize that the resulting value to the world of 
submitting would greatly outweigh the nominal benefit the patent could 
derive from a royalty-generating program.”279 This prediction is quite 
different from the Market Correction Hypothesis’s notion of self-interested 
patent holders rationally seeking the rewards that come from cumulative 
innovation. 
 
276  Eco-Patent Commons, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.wbcsd.org/
work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
277  Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting Additional Patents to the Commons, 2on-Assert 
Pledge, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 6, http://www.wbcsd.org/web/projects/
ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
278  Equitable estoppel is a defense to patent infringement in which an implied license is found in a 
patent holder’s misleading representation of permission. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. 
Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (contrasting legal estoppel from equitable estoppel); 
AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 452–53 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (rejecting equitable estoppel as a basis 
for finding an implied license to a later-acquired patent because there was no showing that the licensor 
had made a false representation); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ 4872 (WHP), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1214, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2004) (“It is axiomatic that to assert equitable estoppel, the 
alleged infringer must have been aware of the patent at issue when it undertook its infringing 
activities.”). 
279  Block, supra note 275, at 26. 
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But why would philanthropically motivated patent holders license their 
patents under the EPC instead of simply donating the patents to the public 
domain? Maintaining an active patent requires periodic payment of 
maintenance fees (which presumably, the EPC’s contributors must continue 
to pay), while a public donation might provide tax breaks.280 While there is 
no clear answer to this question, an IBM executive has commented that 
some companies might see the project as a platform for gaining footholds to 
sell complementary goods and services or to facilitate the widespread 
adoption of certain technological standards.281 
To date, over 100 patents have been donated from 13 participating 
companies.282 A recent empirical study indicates that most of these patents 
are indeed related to the environment and are of at least moderate value.283 
Even so, several patent licensing experts interviewed for this Article 
doubted the EPC’s efficacy.284 Approximately 20% of inventions donated to 
the initiative are expired patents and others are patent applications that have 
not yet been granted.285 But some lawyers interviewed felt that the EPC’s 
greatest weakness lies in the fact that its success cannot be measured: 
Because licensees need not identify themselves, it is impossible to 
determine whether any EPC patents are in fact being used.286 
2. The GreenXchange.—Even more recently, a second patent 
community formed around the goal of freely licensing green technologies. 
This effort, called The GreenXchange (GX), originated from a presentation 
that NIKE, Inc. (Nike) gave at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland.287 The discussion spurred by this presentation on “open-source 
patents” led to meetings between Nike and Creative Commons, a nonprofit 
well-known for its widely used public copyright licenses.288 Soon after, 
 
280  See I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 C.B. 310 (discussing the tax implications of donating 
intellectual property, including patents, for charitable purposes). 
281  See Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Innovation in Clean/Green Technology: Can Patent 
Commons Help?, Presentation Before the Workshop on Innovation Without Patents 7 (June 12, 2010), 
available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/HallHelmers10_ecopats_BW.pdf (quoting IBM’s 
Vice President of Environmental Affairs, Wayne Balta). 
282  Eco-Patent Commons: Eco-Patents Database, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100108051311/http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/GENERICDB/result.asp?D
BID=8&type=p&MenuId=MTU2MQ&doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu&DBEntityTitle=&DBEntity
Text=&char70=&cbo68=&cbo69=&char71= (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
283  See Hall & Helmers, supra note 281, at 9, 18 (noting that patents pledged to the EPC are “more 
valuable than the typical patent in a firm’s portfolio”). 
284  As one executive who was interviewed stated, “[I]t’s highly questionable as to whether [the Eco-
Patent Commons has] had any impact.” Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #6 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
285  See Hall & Helmers, supra note 281, at 24 (reporting these statistics). 
286  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #1 (Sept. 10, 2010). 
287  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #3 (Sept. 28, 2010). 
288  Id. 
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Yahoo! and Best Buy committed their support and the budding effort 
officially launched in January 2010.289 
The GX shares the EPC’s goal of encouraging green innovation but the 
group’s approach is somewhat more business-minded. Project literature 
encourages licensors to donate patents for free, for instance, but the GX 
patent license also permits licensors to charge royalty fees.290 As John 
Wilbanks of Creative Commons explained to the 2ew York Times, “We 
don’t depend on altruism.”291 The GX license also allows licensors to limit 
the range of subject matter they may choose to pledge based on geography 
and fields of use.292 These licensing “toggles” bank on the idea that there is 
sometimes a gap between a patent’s potential and realized value.293 For 
example, Nike might wish to license patented rubber compositions to other 
footwear makers but might not have a business interest in licensing the 
same patents to tire manufacturers. A GX spokesperson explained that by 
facilitating unexpected uses of patents in noncompetitive fields, the GX 
aims to gather a valuable body of inventions.294 
As a new effort, the GX’s ability to attract patent holders remains 
unproven. One insider involved from the early stages reported that Nike 
executives were deeply motivated by the idea that open patent licensing 
could help the company gain new business footholds: “What Nike liked was 
the idea that they could create new relationships with companies they might 
not [otherwise] talk to.”295 What is a bit more puzzling though, is that some 
insiders hope that GX will succeed in gathering so-called “byproduct 
patents”—i.e., inventions that are not core to a patent holder’s business, but 
rather, are a tangential product of day-to-day operations.296 Nike press 
materials state that many “R&D companies create green technologies that 
are not core to their business.”297 Insiders did not offer explanations for why 
a company would pay application and maintenance fees for patents that are 
not expected to generate any revenues. 
 
289  See Press Release, Don Tapscott, The GreenXchange, Davos: Nike and Partners Launch the 
GreenXchange (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.greenxchange.cc/info/release/1-27-2010. 
290  See Pledge and License Types, GREENXCHANGE, http://www.greenxchange.cc (last visited Mar. 
9, 2012) (explaining that the “Standard” license allows for royalty-free use while the “Standard PLUS” 
license allows the patent holder to charge royalty fees). 
291  See Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at N5 
(comparing the GX and the EPC). 
292  Pledge and License Types, supra note 290 (“For example, the patent holder may restrict field of 
use, geography, or require a payment.”). 
293  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #3 (Sept. 28, 2010). 
294  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #6 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
295  Id. 
296  Id. 
297  NIKE, INC., Case Study: GreenXchange., in NIKE, INC. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, 
FISCAL YEARS 2007–2009, at 125, available at http://www.nikebiz.com/crreport/pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 
2012) (discussing Nike’s efforts related to the GX). 
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While these questions remain open, it appears that, like the EPC, the 
GX is not gathering patents that are complementary or that cover related 
technologies. As of this writing, 463 patents have been donated to GX from 
four participating companies.298 Nike, which contributed a lion’s share of 
444 patents to the effort, provided a variety of technologies that describe 
new types of environmentally friendly rubber.299 Examples of donations 
from other organizations include a patent covering methods of using certain 
types of proteins300 and a patent covering a method of converting printers 
into cleaning devices.301 
Ultimately, the EPC and the GX contradict the Market Correction 
Hypothesis in two respects. First, these efforts are not targeting any specific 
anticommons problems. That is, they are not purposefully aggregating 
complementary patent rights whose distribution among multiple rights 
holders is believed to impede research and development. Second, these 
efforts appear to be motivated by charitable goals and thus do not reflect, as 
the theory predicts, patent holders collectively selecting the gains of long-
term innovation over the short-term profits that patents confer.302 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY 
A. Implications for the Market Correction Hypothesis 
The foregoing study suggests some important refinements to theory. 
To begin, it is helpful to briefly revisit the Market Correction Hypothesis. 
As explained in Part I, patent gridlock stems from the fact that product 
research and development often require identifying and licensing multiple 
patents held by different owners. The potential expense and legal 
uncertainty of assembling complementary patent rights discourages 
investments that can spur follow-on innovation.303 The Market Correction 
 
298  See All Organizations, GREENXCHANGE, http://www.greenxchange.cc/browse/all_organizations 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (reflecting these figures); see also 463 Assets, GREENXCHANGE, 
http://www.greenxchange.cc/search (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (searchable database). 
299  See, e.g., 463 Assets, supra note 298; Patent: Rubber Compositions with Increased Shelf Life 
and Reduced Cure Temperatures and Times, GREENXCHANGE (Sept. 16, 2003), http://www.
greenxchange.cc/nike/rubber-compositions-with-increased-shelf-life-and-reduced-cur (documenting 
Nike’s donation of U.S. Patent No. 6,620,871). 
300  See Patent: US Patent 6,858,213 Mycobacterial Sulfaction Pathway Proteins and Methods of 
Use Thereof, GREENXCHANGE (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.greenxchange.cc/ucberkeley/mycobacterial-
sulfation-pathway-proteins-and-methods-of-use-t (documenting U.C. Berkeley’s donation of U.S. Patent 
No. 6,858,213). 
301  See Patent: Sheet Cleaner in a Multi-Station Printing Machine, GREENXCHANGE (Aug. 26, 
2010), http://www.greenxchange.cc/bestbuy/sheet-cleaner-in-a-multi-station-printing-machine 
(documenting Best Buy’s donation of U.S. Patent No. 6,684,769). 
302  See Barnett, supra note 1, at 442. 
303  See supra Part I.A. (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the Market Correction 
Hypothesis). 
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Hypothesis posits that, under some circumstances, firms will lower such 
transaction costs and legal uncertainties by sharing patents. The import of 
this theory is that, through collective action, private actors “correct” the 
government’s errors in distributing excessive patents to enhance cumulative 
innovation.304 
To evaluate this theory, this Article investigated a set of ideal test 
cases. The examples in Part II include contemporary and historical patent-
sharing efforts that all purport to further cumulative innovation. In fact, 
several of these episodes, including The SNP Consortium, the Open 
Invention Network (OIN), and the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association 
(MAA), were explicitly cited in a recent article as support of the theory.305 
Through interviews, firsthand observations, and independent research, this 
Article revealed that the reality of patent sharing diverges from this 
theoretical story in important respects. 
Some of the communities examined were products of government 
intervention. The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) was inspired by the 
hortatory messages that U.K. politicians expressed in the House of 
Commons, in official government reports, and in statements to the press.306 
Similarly, the NIH’s discouragement of SNP patents created a political 
atmosphere in which public and private SNP-sharing efforts took hold and 
succeeded.307 Along with such statements of encouragement, governments 
and publicly funded entities have also done the hard work of planning, 
designing, and implementing invention-sharing regimes. The MPP, for 
instance, is the creation of UNITAID—an organization funded by European 
tax dollars and hosted by the World Health Organization.308 Likewise, the 
U.S. government’s dbSNP, which preceded the SNP Consortium, was 
funded and administered by the NIH.309 Reaching further back in time, we 
find that U.S. politicians designed and implemented the MAA against 
industry protests.310 
In other settings, governmental influence is less obvious but no less 
potent. The Pool for Open Innovation Against Neglected Tropical Diseases 
(NTD Pool) is illustrative on this point. As the interviews referenced in 
subpart II.A.2 reveal, this patent-sharing regime was designed, in part, to 
 
304  See supra Part I.B. (providing scholarship on the Market Correction Hypothesis). 
305  See Barnett, supra note 1, at 428–30, 429 n.104, 437. 
306  See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Medicines Patent Pool). 
307  See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the SNP Consortium). 
308  See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing UNITAID). 
309  See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the SNP Consortium). 
310  See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the MAA). The MAA is just one historical example of the U.S. 
government’s instigation of a patent pool. Another episode documented by scholars is the U.S. Navy’s 
efforts to aggregate radio patents into what ultimately became RCA Corporation. See Merges & Nelson, 
supra note 95, at 892–93 (noting the RCA patent pool). 
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leverage the preexisting FDA Priority Review Voucher system.311 One 
interviewee described the FDA vouchers as a “direct link” between the 
community and prospective members.312 From this perspective, the NTD 
Pool “piggybacks” on an existing policy aimed at encouraging precisely the 
same kind of innovation. Like the SNP Consortium, the MPP, and the 
MAA, the NTD Pool does not align with the Market Correction 
Hypothesis’s depiction of private actors correcting government 
propertization errors. Rather, these examples show the active and visible 
hand of public policy guiding patent sharing.313 
In another divergence from the Market Correction Hypothesis, the 
foregoing study reveals some of the most notable patent-sharing efforts do 
not aim to encourage future innovations but rather are set on the backward-
facing goal of settling or preventing litigation over existing products. The 
primary purpose of the OIN, for instance, is to serve as a bulwark against 
long-anticipated litigation over the Linux operating system. This defensive 
mission is reflected in the OIN patent license, which discourages lawsuits 
over Linux but does not clearly facilitate the development of future 
software products or innovations.314 An historical analogue to this effort is 
the Bessemer Association, which was devised to settle a bitter litigation 
over “blocking” patents relating to an existing method of steelmaking.315 
Although the science of steelmaking improved during the late nineteenth 
century, no historical sources point to the Bessemer Association as an 
impetus for innovation. 
Apart from resolving litigation, some of the communities examined 
have a charitable aspect to them, suggesting that they may be motivated less 
by private gain than by social goals. As a lawyer involved with the NTD 
Pool stated, “GSK’s aim . . . was to be a good corporate citizen.”316 
Similarly, an executive at Nike described The GreenXchange (GX), which 
will soon be incorporated as a nonprofit, as driven “by a sense of corporate 
responsibility.”317 
 
311  See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the NTD Pool). 
312  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #8 (Feb. 7, 2011). 
313  The U.S. government has also encouraged “precompetitive” collaboratives by enacting laws that 
reduce antitrust penalties for such groups. See National Cooperative Research & Production Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2006). Some federal agencies such as the FDA and NIH have also 
collaborated directly with private industry on collaborative biomedical research projects. See, e.g., 
BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, http://www.biomarkersconsortium.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). While 
such projects show the importance of government involvement, they fall outside the scope of this Article 
because they are not responses to patent gridlock. Rather they are responses to a more generalized lack 
of innovation in certain industries. 
314  See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the OIN). 
315  See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Bessemer Association). 
316  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #7 (Feb. 7, 2011). 
317  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #6 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
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Moving on to the actual substance of patent sharing, not all of the 
communities examined are aggregating complementary patents. To 
appreciate this fact, it is helpful to view complementarity as a spectrum. On 
one end of the spectrum, patent owners can only derive value from their 
individual inventions through aggregation. SNPs, which are only useful to 
researchers in large numbers, demonstrate this type of “strict 
complementarity.”318 Further down the spectrum, individual patents may be 
valuable on their own but can also be combined in new and useful ways. 
Cournot’s stylized example of the fusion of copper and zinc into brass 
illustrates this type of relationship.319 In the context of patents, the fixed-
dose antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) that the MPP has targeted for 
development are a comparable example.320 Finally, there is sometimes little 
or no value in combining patents. This describes the relationships among 
some of the patents sought by the Eco-Patent Commons (EPC) and the GX, 
many of which relate to different fields of technology.321 Although these 
efforts have the backing and participation of large patent holders, the 
proverbial tragedy of the anticommons cannot be solved simply by 
aggregating just any patents. This observation is by no means a negative 
reflection of either effort—the EPC and the GX may make valuable 
contributions to society. Neither effort, however, seems poised to weaken 
patent gridlock that blocks the way to new innovations. 
This observation highlights an important insight: Unlike tragedies of 
the commons, tragedies of the anticommons involve property rights that are 
interrelated. The degree to which patents are interrelated and the resulting 
degree of patent gridlock that may exist within a given industry can be 
highly contextual. As the examples discussed in this Article show, 
complementarity can vary greatly depending on the kind of technology at 
stake (e.g., SNPs versus drugs), and the stage of technological development 
(e.g., early research versus late-stage development). Ultimately, a 
community’s ability to overcome patent gridlock is not only a product of 
the sheer number of patents it collects but also a product of the degree of 
complementarity among those patents. As a result, although the Market 
Correction Hypothesis may not apply to innovations that are years or 
decades away, the theory may be entirely applicable when the contours of a 
new technology are well-defined and near at hand. 
We must be careful to note that these conclusions do not undermine the 
potential value of collective patent licensing itself. To the contrary, several 
examples in this Article reveal that, when properly guided by policymakers, 
 
318  See Merges, supra note 55, at 163 (discussing strict complementarity between patents). 
319  See supra Part I.A (discussing Cournot’s study of monopolies). 
320  See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing fixed-dose ARVs). 
321  See supra Part II.C (discussing the EPC and the GX). 
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patent sharing can sometimes effectively mitigate patent gridlock.322 The 
SNP Consortium, for instance, effectively warded off a widely anticipated 
research anticommons through the formation of a publicly accessible 
genetic database.323 Likewise, legal commentators have noted that the MAA 
enabled valuable innovation in the aircraft industry, at least in the 
organization’s early years.324 In this respect, the Article provides empirical 
support for the claim that anticommons problems can indeed be 
counteracted through collective patent licensing. The new insight here 
relates to how these institutions take form and sustain: Contrary to the 
prevailing view, communities of innovation must be conceived of as 
creatures of policy and not purely market forces. 
The foregoing analysis can be reduced to a digestible set of insights: 
This study does not support the hypothesis that innovation markets tend to 
correct government propertization errors. To the contrary, it suggests that 
valuable patent sharing can sometimes only occur when policymakers get 
involved. When private patent holders have collectively organized without 
government intervention, their goals have often been unrelated to furthering 
long-term innovation. Defensive patent-sharing communities, for instance, 
focus more on protecting existing products than on promoting future 
product development. Charitable patent-sharing communities, as another 
example, do not necessarily aggregate complementary patents. Those 
efforts that are carefully targeted at overcoming anticommons problems are 
largely products of policymaking. A corollary of these observations is that, 
while the Market Correction Hypothesis may sometimes be accurate—this 
Article is not an exhaustive study and thus does not foreclose this 
possibility—the theory is mostly likely to apply only when a product is near 
at hand. This is because it is easier to identify and gather complementary 
upstream patents that might cover an identifiable class of products than it is 
to gather patents that fall under the umbrella of a broad and nebulous 
problem. 
B. Recommendations 
That patent gridlock has not been cured through private cooperation 
alone is not an altogether pessimistic observation. As the foregoing 
discussion notes, communities of innovation led by policymakers have 
proven to be effective remedies to anticommons problems. What must be 
 
322  But see Ryan L. Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from 
the 19th-Century Sewing-Machine Industry 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
15061, 2009), available at http://economics.stanford.edu/files/LampeOct15.pdf (discussing how some 
patent-sharing regimes can actually discourage innovation). 
323  See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the SNP Consortium). 
324  See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 10, at 31 (stating that “innovation in American airplane 
technology resumed” following the formation of the MAA). 
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considered, then, is how policymakers can most effectively encourage and 
guide these kinds of institutions.325 
The most obvious mechanism to encourage patent licensing that has 
been discussed (and criticized) in the literature is compulsory licensing. 
This solution lowers transaction costs by transferring the power to set 
licensing fees from patent holders to neutral third parties—typically, 
administrative agencies or special tribunals.326 In a more targeted way, some 
have argued for mandatory royalty-free cross-licensing of all federally 
funded inventions for research.327 While these ideas are valuable and 
important, compulsory licensing is a relatively extreme form of intervention 
and not widely available under U.S. law.328 Thus, solutions involving 
compulsory licenses may have trouble gathering the necessary political 
goodwill to get adopted. More moderate solutions are needed. 
The communities of innovation examined in this Article point towards 
alternative policy measures that are at once more moderate and more 
targeted to address anticommons problems than compulsory licensing is. 
These solutions define a spectrum of involvement: from issuing hortatory 
statements, to offering various incentives, to directly designing and 
implementing patent-sharing communities themselves.329 The paragraphs 
that follow provide an overview of how policymakers informed by these 
case studies can help to establish communities of innovation. 
The least intrusive step that regulators can take is to encourage and 
validate patent-sharing proposals through official statements. The MAA 
provides a helpful example of how this type of intervention can work. The 
institution itself was conceived of and endorsed by a committee of experts 
appointed by President Wilson and was later declared legal under antitrust 
laws by the U.S. Attorney General. Following this official sanction, the plan 
took hold within private industry.330 Similarly, the MPP took form at the 
urging of well-informed U.K. public servants. As mentioned in Part II, The 
Lancet recently urged policymakers to become even more vocal in 
 
325  See, e.g., Merges, supra note 90, at 1355 (“[N]ot only should the government exercise restraint 
in banning pools as violations of antitrust policy, but also . . . the government may consider assisting the 
creation of patent pools.”). 
326  See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 24, at 214 (proposing a compulsory licensing 
scheme). 
327  See Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded 
Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 442–43 (2006) (discussing this 
proposal and its benefits). 
328  But see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 31, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
313 (1995) (providing for compulsory licensing of patents under certain conditions). 
329  See supra Part II (discussing the interplay between government policies and patent licensing 
collectives). 
330  See supra Part II.A.4. 
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supporting the effort.331 These examples illustrate how, working in concert, 
politicians and regulators can encourage meaningful exchanges through 
declarations alone. 
A second class of measures concerns substantive incentives. The NTD 
Pool, which was keenly designed to bank off of FDA Priority Review 
Vouchers (PRV), provides a helpful example of how such incentives could 
be tailored.332 In its current design, the FDA PRV system rewards drug 
developers, but not the patent holders that license intellectual property 
rights to them. As a result, this incentive may draw licensees to the NTD 
Pool, but not necessarily licensors.333 To more directly encourage patent 
holders to share, the FDA could extend its voucher program to include 
patent holders. The FDA could make PRVs available not only to drug 
developers, but to all patent holders whose upstream innovations enabled 
the downstream products that qualify for PRVs. This suggestion is one 
example of an administrative “carrot” that could encourage valuable patent 
community building.334 
Finally, policymakers can take the bold step of funding and 
establishing patent-sharing regimes themselves. As the NIH’s SNP database 
shows, communities of innovation run by the public sector can be highly 
effective at countering anticommons problems. By tailoring the scope of a 
patent-sharing effort to specific classes of products—e.g., pediatric 
ARVs—policymakers could target manageable and identifiable sets of 
patents. Leading commentators have argued that the public sector is 
actually in a very good position to make these sorts of determinations.335 
Unbound by market pressures and shareholder demands, public entities are 
well-positioned to administer sharing regimes and to mediate neutrally 
between various interest groups. 
From a political perspective, the government’s backing of communities 
of innovation should not stir controversy. Patents themselves are figments 
of policy, and—as the case studies in this Article show—patent 
communities have long been instigated and guided by the public sector. 
Moreover, these recommendations are modest. Unlike compulsory licensing 
proposals,336 these suggestions encourage patent sharing rather than force it. 
In this respect, they largely preserve incentives to innovate, and at the same 
 
331  See supra Part II.A.1. 
332  See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the role that FDA Priority Review Vouchers play in the NTD 
Pool). 
333  In fact, the community discourages licensors from demanding vouchers from licensees. 
334  Cf. IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS 
DONE 24–28 (2010) (discussing the role of contingent rewards and penalties as “the basic building 
blocks of economic incentives”). 
335  Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 304–05 (noting that fund-granting agencies “are well-
positioned to take into account the impact of upstream patents on both future product development and 
future scientific research”). 
336  See Pulsinelli, supra note 327. 
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time, enable the public sector to play an active and meaningful role in 
instigating and guiding communities of innovation. 
CONCLUSION 
It should come as no surprise that the realities of patent sharing are 
more complex than theory suggests. As Elinor Ostrom and other political 
economists demonstrated, property sharing is highly dependent on 
context.337 Indeed, the shape of each patent-sharing initiative discussed in 
this Article is as unique as the particular circumstances—technological, 
economic, and political—that inspired it. These stories of success, failure, 
cooperation, and conflict provide several important refinements to our 
understanding of the role of collective action in our patent system. 
First, companies sometimes share patents in response to government 
pressure. The Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association, for instance, was the 
product of direct government intervention. The U.S. government conceived 
of the pool and pressured the key patent holders, Wright and Curtiss, to 
cooperate.338 In a more subtle way, the SNP Consortium formed in the wake 
of the U.S. government’s own effort to gather patentable data.339 Today, the 
Medicines Patent Pool is taking form under similar pressures. The effort 
was conceived of by policymakers and has been spearheaded by a publicly 
funded organization associated with the U.K. government.340 These 
observations do not align with the Market Correction Hypothesis’s 
depiction of private actors correcting government propertization errors.341 
Second, some patent-sharing communities are focused on facilitating 
the production and use of existing products, rather than encouraging the 
development of future technologies. The primary purpose of the Open 
Invention Network, for instance, is to serve as a bulwark against litigation 
directed at the Linux operating system rather than to provide fertile ground 
for future inventions.342 Likewise, the primary goal of the Bessemer 
Association was to allow steel mills to practice an existing steelmaking 
process.343 
Third, some of the efforts discussed in this Article have a charitable 
aspect to them, suggesting they are more driven by social goals than 
economics. Broad charitable missions appear to encourage donations of 
broad sets of patents, many of which are not complementary. In its most 
 
337  See supra Part I.B. 
338  See supra Part II.A.4. 
339  See supra Part II.A.3. 
340  See supra Part II.A.1. 
341  This observation accords with Arti Rai’s work on patent pools. See generally Arti Kaur Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 2orms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 77, 130–33 (1999) (arguing that patent pools often only emerge with difficulty). 
342  See supra Part II.B.1. 
343  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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unqualified and optimistic form, the Market Correction Hypothesis assumes 
that nearly any aggregation of patents is prima facie evidence of a market 
correction. This view ignores the fact that, unlike a natural resource 
commons, the patent anticommons is built on assets that are interrelated in 
complicated ways. We cannot expect that the sharing of patents that are 
unrelated or only loosely related will cure the dilemma of patent gridlock. 
A corollary of this observation is that patent sharing may be most 
capable of enhancing innovation in settings where specific patents, or at 
least specific products, can be identified—typically, further toward the 
“product” end of a development timeline. The Medicines Patent Pool, for 
instance, targets pediatric antiretroviral drugs.344 Likewise, the Pool for 
Open Innovation Against Neglected Tropical Diseases targets a clearly 
defined set of specific diseases.345 At the far end of the spectrum, however, 
efforts like the Eco-Patent Commons are aimed broadly at the problem of 
environmental harm. Here, at the research stage, patents are more akin to 
the presence of “dark matter” in the universe: their influence can be felt, but 
they evade easy identification. 
Underlying all of these observations are truths about the role of 
collective action in our patent system. The Market Correction Hypothesis 
proposes that patent holders, guided by an enlightened sense of self-interest, 
will choose to reap the long-term gains of innovation over the short-term 
gains that patents confer. What this theory overlooks, however, is the fact 
that cooperation is always shaped by circumstance. Patent sharing regimes 
are forged on diverse challenges and hopes. They can provide shelter from 
outside threats as well as foundations on which to build for the future. 
Perhaps most importantly, though, these communities cannot be expected to 
form without governmental support. 
The results of the ethnographic inquiry conducted in this Article should 
not be thought of as a conclusion but rather as a first step. From here, 
academics, policymakers, and the public can begin a new discussion about 
how to build communities of innovation that will flourish and endure. 
 
344  See supra Part II.A.1. 
345  See supra Part II.A.2. 
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